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Updated Sunday 15 May, 2011 12:18 PM |
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This Day in Alternate History Blog
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Razor's Edge: The Unofficial History of the Falklands War
Hugh Bicheno If Tom Kratman were to start writing history books it would read a lot like Hugh Bicheno. That was a compliment, by the way. The Falklands War took place in the same year I was born. Recently, there have been quite a few ceremonies remembering the war – and at least one expose of a hoaxer who claimed to be in the Paras fighting the war – and a consequent rise in the number of books published about the war. Older books, such as Max Hastings’ overview – and Martin Middlebrook’s study of The Argentine Fight For The Falklands, have been joined by the ‘unoffical’ Razor’s Edge. Nothing is spared here, not even the politicians… Bicheno – quite rightly – is utterly scathing on the reaction of the British Establishment to the run-up to the war. The Establishment, far from the rapid and desperate rewrite of history to claim that they had supported the right of the Falkland islanders to self-determination, tried several times to sell them out to Argentina. This muddled impression of British politics created the worst of all possible worlds; an enemy convinced that the British would, to use Bicheno’s phase, "bend over and take it," and a political climate in Britain that would accept no compromise. Not that compromise was possible, of course. Bicheno reminds us of the uncomfortable fact – often expressed as "it takes one to fight a war, but two to make a peace" – that there are very real limits on what can be compromised. If one party’s minimum demands are far higher than the other can pay, then there will be no compromise; there can’t be any compromise. Having literally led the Argies on, the Establishment seemed to assume that the talking could either go on forever, or at a favourable political moment, the Islanders could be dumped and left to the tender mercies of the fascist junta. This made war inevitable, not least because other countries – particularly America – were reluctant to provide much support when they feared the British would find a face-saving way out of the conflict. And so the war began… Bicheno does not cover the military actions in day-by-day detail, although he does cover several of the most important battles. It was, to paraphrase, a war of muddling through; the British were just better at that than the enemy. A stout defence of the islands might have made the liberation impossible; a lucky hit on either of the two carriers would have made it much harder, if not impossible, for the British to support their operations. The sinking of the Argentinean heavy cruiser, the General Belgrano, is justified; Thatcher’s political blunders were political ones, not military ones. The ship presented a very real threat and was a legitimate target. The hand-wringing of certain parties was about as justified as it would have been in 1941, had it happened when the Bismarck was sunk. He also makes grim points about the effects of the world media and the politicians in the war. The BBC made several damaging exposes of British secrets; one ‘off-the-record’ briefing might have done more harm than a shipload of antiship missiles. Bicheno’s outspokenness may come as a surprise to readers who prefer more traditional histories. In this case, however, it works; this is not only a refreshing introduction to the Falklands War, but also an expose of skulduggery in high places.
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