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Updated Sunday 15 May, 2011 12:18 PM |
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This Day in Alternate History Blog
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Secrets and Lies: The
Planning, Conduct and Aftermath of Blair and Bush's War It is always a shame to
watch a fine mind go to waste. Dilip
Hiro, known for his almost-unique history of the Iran-Iraq War (The Longest
War) and for his research into Iraq and the Middle East, has finally turned
his attention to the Iraq War of 2003. Unfortunately,
to paraphrase Bart Simpson, this book is so anti-American – it fairly drips of
rancour – that it’s not even funny anymore. Reading the book, one
gets the feeling that the Americans lost the war – it comes as a shock to
discover that they won! Hiro
chronicles what seems like defeat after defeat, followed by vast incompetence
and skullduggery, leaving the reader confused and baffled.
Every incident that can be used to blacken America’s name is used with
great effect to do just that. As an example, Hiro
refers to the delay in re-establishing the electrical grid in Baghdad, pointing
out rather patronisingly that Saddam’s people had it done in a day after the
1991 war. He fails to point
out that if there were attacks on Saddam’s people – who also knew Baghdad
far better than Americans – Saddam would shrug and order a few dozen people
shot. Even the Bush of the left’s
nightmares could not do that. Hiro also makes a far
greater fuss about the WMD issue than it deserves. Although he is correct to note that there have been fewer
discoveries than expected, he fails to note that the inspectors found a
dissembled gun, rather than a smoking gun.
He also fails to point out that Saddam had engaged in constant attempts
to hide his WMD from US, UN and other inspectors. As both Elkus and Butler point out, Saddam fought bitterly to
hold onto what he had, only destroying WMD after it was discovered by the
inspectors. While Saddam might have
genuinely destroyed his remaining supplies of WMD, in effect the US was no
longer inclined to accept his assurances. If
you lie more than once, you should not be surprised if you are no longer
believed, even if you are telling the truth. He also fails to discuss
the other good reasons for launching the invasion.
This is particularly disappointing given his work on the effects of the
Gulf Wars on Iraq, where large numbers of the population suffered through
sanctions and repression; Hiro makes it sound as if Saddam’s rule was a golden
age. Removing Saddam’s regime was
a good act in itself; a successful transition to democracy would be even better.
Expecting instant prosperity was unreasonable; Germany, Japan and Taiwan
took at least fifteen years before they could become democratic – establishing
law and order was the first priority. Finally, Hiro notes that
Saddam and Bin Ladin apparently had no connection. While this – as far as the 9/11 commission can discover –
is true, he ignores the presence of other terror groups within the country,
including Ansar Al Islam, which did have ties to Al Qaida.
Iraq has provided support to terror groups in the past; perhaps it would
have done so again, if only to keep it’s tattered Islamic credentials.
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