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Updated Sunday 15 May, 2011 12:18 PM |
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This Day in Alternate History Blog
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Why Japan Really Lost The War
This very useful document was written by another
person, not me, and can also be found at www.combinedfleet.com.
Please direct all further inquires there.
Introduction
It's no secret that Japan was, shall we say,
'economically disadvantaged' in her ability to wage war against the Allies.
However, the sheer, stunning magnitude of this economic disparity has
never ceased to amaze me. So, just go give you an idea of the magnitude of the
mismatch here, I decided to compile a few statistics. Most of them are taken
from Paul Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" (which,
among other things, contains an excellent analysis of the economic forces at
work in World War II, and is an all-around great book) and John Ellis'
"World War II: A Statistical Survey." In this comparison I will focus
primarily on the two chief antagonists in the Pacific War: Japan and the United
States. They say that economics is the 'Dismal Science'; you're about to see
why....
Overview
By the time World War II began to rear it's ugly
head (formally in 1939 in Poland, informally in China in 1937), America had been
in the grips of the Great Depression for a decade, give or take. The net effect
of the Depression was to introduce a lot of 'slack' into the U.S. economy. Many
U.S. workers were either unemployed (10 million in 1939) or underemployed, and
our industrial base as a whole had far more capacity than was needed at the
time. In economic terms, our 'Capacity Utilization' (CapU), was pretty darn low.
To an outside culture, particularly a militaristic one such as Japan's, America
certainly might have appeared to be 'soft' and unprepared for a major war.
Further, Japan's successes in fighting far larger opponents (Russia in the early
1900's, and China in the 1930's) and the fact that Japan's own economy was
practically 'superheating' (mostly as the result of unhealthy levels of military
spending -- 28% of national income in 1937) probably filled the Japanese with a
misplaced sense of economic and military superiority over their large overseas
foe. However, a dispassionate observer would also note a few important facts.
America, even in the midst of seemingly interminable economic doldrums, still
had:
Furthermore, America had some hidden advantages
that didn't show up directly in production figures. For one, U.S. factories
were, on average, more modern and automated than those in Europe or in Japan.
Additionally, American managerial practice at that time was the best in the
world. Taken in combination, the per capita productivity of the American
worker was the highest in the world. Furthermore, the United States was more
than willing to utilize American women in the war effort: a tremendous
advantage for us, and a concept which the Axis Powers seem not to have grasped
until very late in the conflict. The net effect of all these factors meant that
even in the depths of the Depression, American war-making potential was still
around seven times larger than Japan's, and had the 'slack' been taken out in
1939, it was closer to nine or ten times as great! In fact, accroding to
Kennedy, a breakdown of total global warmaking potential in 1937 looks something
like this:
Country % of Total Warmaking Potential United States 41.7% Germany 14.4% USSR 14.0% UK 10.2% France 4.2% Japan 3.5% Italy 2.5% Seven Powers (total) (90.5%) When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in
December 1941, the sleeping giant was awakened and came looking for trouble. And
even though the majority of America's war-making potential was slated for use
against Germany (which was by far the most dangerous of the Axis foes, again for
reasons of economics), there was still plenty left over for use against
Japan. By mid-1942, even before U.S. force of arms was being dramatically felt
globally, American factories were nevertheless beginning to make a material
effect in the war's progress. The U.S. churned out seemingly endless quantities
of equipment and provision which were then funnelled to not only our own forces,
but to those of Great Britain and the USSR as well. By 1944, most of the other
powers in the war, though still producing furiously, were beginning to max out
their economies (i.e. production was stabilizing or plateauing). This resulted
from destruction of industrial bases and constriction of resource pools (in the
case of Germany and Japan), or through sheer exhaustion of manpower (in the case
of Great Britain and, to an extent, the USSR). By contrast, the United States
suffered from none of these difficulties, and as a consequence its economy grew
at an annual rate of 15% throughout the war years. As scary as it sounds, by the
end of the war, the United States was really just beginning to get 'warmed up.'
It is perhaps not surprising that in 1945, the U.S. accounted for over 50% of
total global GNP.
War Production
What, then, were the concrete outputs, in terms
of 'beans and bullets', of the two competing industrial bases? I have presented
some statistics on this matter in the following tables. I start with naval
vessels, because they were a very important index of power in the Pacific War.
Warship Production
United States CV/CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Escorts Subs Japan CV/CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Escorts Subs 1941 - 2 1 2 - 2 1941 6 1 - - ? - 1942 18 4 8 82 - 34 1942 4 1 4 10 ? 61 1943 65 2 11 128 298 55 1943 2 - 3 12 ? 37 1944 45 2 14 74 194 81 1944 5 - 2 24 ? 39 1945 13 - 14 63 6 31 1945 - - - 17 ? 30 Total 141 10 48 349 498 203 Total 17 2 9 63 ? 167 [Key: CV/CVL/CVE = Aircraft Carriers of all
kinds; BB = Battleship; CA/CL= Heavy Cruiser, Light Cruiser; DD =Destroyer;
Escorts = Destroyer escorts, frigates, sloops and corvettes]
A couple of points need to made here. First, the
majority of the carriers listed in the U.S. totals were 'Jeep' carriers, CVEs
carrying a couple dozen aircraft and suitable mostly for escort duties rather
than front-line combat (which didn't subtract a whit from their effectiveness as
antisubmarine or ground-support platforms). But it should also be noted that the
American CVs on average operated substantially larger air wings than their
Japanese counterparts (80-90 vs. 60-70 aircraft). The net result; by 1944, when
Task Force 38 or 58 (depending on whether Halsey or Spruance was in charge of
the main American carrier force at the moment) came to play, they could be
counted upon to bring nearly a thousand combat aircraft with them. That
kind of power projection capability was crucial to winning the war -- we could
literally bring more aircraft to the party than any island air base could put up
in its own defense, as the neutralization of both Truk and the Marshall Islands
attests.
The other important figure here is the DD/Escort
totals. Japan, an island empire totally dependent on maintaining open sea lanes
to ensure her raw material imports, managed to build just sixty-three DDs (some
twenty or so of which would have been classified by the Allies as DEs) and an
unspecified (and by my unofficial count, relatively small) number of 'escort'
vessels. In the same time span, the US put some eight hundred forty-seven
antisubmarine capable craft in the water! And that total doesn't even cover the
little stuff like the armed yachts and subchasers we used off our Eastern
seaboard against the German U-Boats. All in all, by the end of the war, American
naval power was unprecedented. In fact, by 1945 the U.S. Navy was larger than
every other navy in the world, combined!
The Pacific War was also very much a war of
merchant shipping, in that practically everything needed to defend and/or
assault the various island outposts of the Japanese Empire had to be transported
across vast stretches of ocean. Japan also had to maintain her vital supply
lanes to places like Borneo and Java in order to keep her industrial base
supplied. A look at the relative shipbuilding output of the two antagonists is
enlightening.
Merchant Ship Production (in tons)
Year United States Japan 1939 376,419 320,466 1940 528,697 293,612 1941 1,031,974 210,373 1942 5,479,766 260,059 1943 11,448,360 769,085 1944 9,288,156 1,699,203 1945 5,839,858 599,563 Total 33,993,230 4,152,361 Every time I look at these number, I just shake
my head in amazement. The United States built more merchant shipping in the
first four and a half months of 1943 than Japan put in the water in seven
years. The other really interesting thing is that there was really no
noticeable increase in Japanese merchant vessel building until 1943, by which
time it was already way too late to stop the bleeding. Just as with their
escort building programs, the Japanese were operating under a tragically flawed
national strategy that dictated that the war with the United States would be a
short one. Again, the United States had to devote a lot of the merchant shipping
it built to replace the losses inflicted by the German U-Boats. But it is no
joke to say that we were literally building ships faster than anybody could sink
them, and still have enough left over to carry mountains of material to the most
God-forsaken, desolate stretches of the Pacific. Those Polynesian cargo cults
didn't start for no reason, and it was American merchant vessels in their
thousands which delivered the majority of this seemingly divinely profligate
largesse to backwaters which had probably never seen so much as a can opener
before.
Finally, no examination of the Pacific War would
be complete without taking a look at air power. For all the talk of the Pacific
War being a 'Carrier War', an aircraft carrier is really nothing more than a
vehicle to deliver an airplane to an area of operations. While airplanes
certainly couldn't take and hold islands by themselves, air supremacy was vital
in ensuring that such bastions could be reduced and captured. Below is a table
depicting the aircraft production of the two antagonists.
Aircraft Production
Year United States Japan 1939 5,856 4,467 1940 12,804 4,768 1941 26,277 5,088 1942 47,836 8,861 1943 85,898 16,693 1944 96,318 28,180 1945 49,761 8,263 Total 324,750 76,320 Again, a pretty staggering difference. Not only
that, but as Paul Kennedy points out, the Allies were not only cranking out more
planes, but many of them were of newer design as well, such as the new
F4U Corsair and F6F Hellcat fighter aircraft. Japan, on the other hand, pretty
much relied on variants of the Zero fighter throughout the war. The Zero was a
brilliant design in many respects, but by 1943 had clearly been surpassed by the
newer American models. This pattern was repeated across every category of
airplane in the two opposing arsenals. In addition, a large part of the American
production total (some 97,810 units) was composed of multiengined (either two or
four engines) bombers, whereas only 15,117 of the Japanese planes were bombers
(which were universally two engine varieties). Thus, if one were to look at
aircraft production in terms of total number of engines, total weight of
aircraft produced, or total weight of combat payload, the differences in
production would become even more pronounced.
Strategic Implications
So America had an advantage; so what? Well, as an
example, let's take a moment to consider the importance of the Battle of Midway.
Midway is often cited as the 'Turning Point in the Pacific', the 'Battle that
Doomed Japan,' and a string of other stirring epithets. And there's no question
that it broke the offensive capability of the Japanese Navy. The question I ask
is: what difference would America's economic strength have made if the Americans
had lost badly at the Battle of Midway? Let's take the worst case
scenario (which, incidentally, was very unlikely, given our advantage of
strategic surprise) in which a complete reversal of fortune occurs and the U.S.
loses Enterprise, Yorktown, and Hornet, and Japan loses none
of the four carriers which were present. After such a hypothetical battle, the
balance of carrier forces available for Pacific duty would have looked like
this:
Midway: Before and After American CVs / CVLs Total Ships / Total Aircraft Japanese CVs / CVLs Total Ships / Total Aircraft Pre-Midway Saratoga (88), Wasp (in
Atlantic) (76), Enterprise (85), Yorktown (85), Hornet (85) 5 CV Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu
(71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30) 6 CV Post-Midway Saratoga (88), Wasp (in
Atlantic) (76), Enterprise (85), Hornet (85) 4 CV Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84),
Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30) 2 CV Post-Midway Saratoga (88), Wasp (76) 2 CV Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu
(71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30) 6 CV The question is, would losing Midway really
have mattered? How long would it have taken America's shipyards to make good the
difference and dig us out of the hole? Let's find out. We'll take the table just
presented above and extend it out until the end of the war (in 6-month
increments). Here are the assumptions I'll use while doing so:
Here's how the numbers work out:
Date American CVs / CVLs Total Ships / Total Aircraft Japanese CVs / CVLs Total Ships / Total Aircraft 7/1/42- Saratoga (88), Wasp (76) 2 CV Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu
(71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30) 6 CV 1/1/43- Saratoga (88), Wasp (76), Essex
(82), Independence (33), Princeton (33) 3CV Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu
(71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30) 6 CV 7/1/43- Saratoga (88), Wasp (76),
Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington II (91),
Intrepid (91), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood
(33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Cabot (33) 7 CV Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu
(71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30) 6 CV 1/1/44- Saratoga (88), Wasp (76),
Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington (91), Wasp II
(91), Intrepid (91), Hornet II (91), Franklin (91),
Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33),
Monterey (33), Langley (33), Bataan (33), San Jacinto (33) 10 CV Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu
(71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30), Chiyoda
(30), Chitose (30) 6 CV 7/1/44- Saratoga (88), Wasp (76),
Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington (91), Wasp (91),
Intrepid (91), Hornet (91), Franklin (91), Ticonderoga (91), Hancock
(91), Bennington (91), Shangri-La (91), Independence (33), Princeton
(33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33),
Bataan (33), San Jacinto (33) 14 CV Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu
(71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Taiho (60), Unryu (65),
Amagi (65), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30), Chiyoda (30), Chitose (30) 9 CV 1/1/45- Saratoga (88), Wasp (76),
Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington (91), Wasp (91),
Intrepid (91), Hornet (91), Franklin (91), Ticonderoga (91), Hancock
(91), Bennington (91), Shangri-La (91), Bon Homme Richard (91),
Randolph (91), Antietam (91), Independence (33), Princeton (33),
Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Bataan
(33), San Jacinto (33) 17 CV Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu
(71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Taiho (60), Unryu (65), Shinano
(45), Amagi (65), Katsuragi (65), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30),
Chiyoda (30), Chitose (30) 11 CV 7/1/45- Saratoga (88), Wasp (76),
Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington (91), Wasp (91),
Intrepid (91), Hornet (91), Franklin (91), Ticonderoga (91), Hancock
(91), Bennington (91), Shangri-La (91), Bon Homme Richard (91), Randolph
(91), Antietam (91), Coral Sea (120), Lake Champlain (91), Boxer (91),
Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33),
Monterey (33), Langley (33), Bataan (33), San Jacinto (33) 20 CV Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu
(71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Taiho (60), Unryu (65),
Shinano (45), Amagi (65), Katsuragi (65), Kasagi (?) (65), Ryujo
(38), Zuiho (30), Chiyoda (30), Chitose (30), Ibuki (?) (27) 12 CV 1/1/46- Saratoga (88), Wasp (76),
Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington (91), Wasp (91),
Intrepid (91), Hornet (91), Franklin (91), Ticonderoga (91), Hancock
(91), Bennington (91), Shangri-La (91), Bon Homme Richard (91), Randolph
(91), Antietam (91), Lake Champlain (91), Boxer (91), Kearsarge (91),
Princeton II (91), Oriskany (91), Tarawa (91), Coral Sea (120), Franklin
Roosevelt (120), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood
(33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Bataan (33), San
Jacinto (33) 25 CV Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu
(71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Taiho (60), Unryu (65),
Shinano (45), Amagi (65), Katsuragi (65), Kasagi (?) (65), Aso (?)
(65), Ikoma (?) (65), Ibuki (?) (27), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30),
Chiyoda (30), Chitose (30) 14 CV In other words, even if it had lost
catastrophically at the Battle of Midway, the United States Navy still would
have broken even with Japan in carriers and naval air power by about September
1943. Nine months later, by the middle of 1944, the U.S. Navy would have enjoyed
a nearly two-to-one superiority in carrier aircraft capacity! Not only that, but
with her newer, better aircraft designs, the U.S. Navy would have enjoyed not
only a substantial numeric, but also a critical qualitative advantage as well,
starting in late 1943. All this is not to say that losing the Battle of
Midway would not have been a serious blow to American fortunes! For instance,
the war would almost certainly have been protracted if the U.S. had been unable
to mount some sort of a credible counter-stroke in the Solomons during the
latter half of 1942. Without carrier-based air power of some sort there would
not have been much hope of doing so, meaning that we would most likely have lost
the Solomons. However, the long-term implications are clear: the United States
could afford to make good losses that the Japanese simply could not.
Furthermore, this comparison does not reflect the fact that the United States
actually slowed down it's carrier building program in late 1944, as it became
increasingly evident that there was less need for them. Had the U.S. lost at
Midway, it seems likely that those additional carriers (3 Midway-class
and 6 more Essex-Class CVs, plus the Saipan-class CVLs) would have
been brought on line more quickly. In a macro-economic sense, then, the Battle
of Midway was really a non-event. There was no need for the U.S. to seek a
single, decisive battle which would 'Doom Japan' -- Japan was doomed by it's
very decision to make war.
The final evidence of this economic mismatch lies
in the development of the Atomic bomb. The Manhattan Project required an
enormous commitment on the part of the United States. And as Paul Kennedy
states, "...it was the United States alone which at this time had the
productive and technological resources not only to wage two large-scale
conventional wars but also to invest the scientists, raw materials, and money
(about $2 billion) in the development of a new weapon which might or might not
work." In other words, our economy was so dominant that we knew we could
afford to fund one of the greatest scientific endeavors in history largely from
the 'leftovers' of our war effort! Whatever one may think morally or
strategically about the usage of nuclear weapons against Japan, it is clear that
their very development was a demonstration of unprecedented economic strength.
Conclusion
In retrospect, it is difficult to comprehend how
Japan's leadership managed to rationalize their way around the economic facts
when they contemplated making war on the U.S. After all, these were not stupid
men. Indeed, internal Imperial Navy studies conducted in 1941 showed exactly the
trends in naval shipbuilding I have outlined above. In the end, however, the
Tojo government chose the path of aggression, compelled by internal political
dynamics which made the prospect of a general Japanese disengagement in China
(which was the only means by which the American economic embargo would have been
lifted) too humiliating a course to be taken. Consequently, the Japanese
embarked on what can only be described as a suicidal venture, against an
overwhelmingly large foe. However, their greatest mistake was not just
disregarding the economic muscle which lay partially dormant on the other side
of the Pacific. In actuality, their chief error lay in misreading the will of
the American people. When the American giant awoke, it did not lapse into
despair as a result of the defeats that Japan had inflicted upon it. Rather, it
awoke in a rage, and applied every ounce of its tremendous strength with
a cold, methodical fury against its foe. The grim price Japan paid -- 1.8
million military casualties, the complete annihilation of its military, a half
million or so civilians killed, and the utter destruction of practically every
major urban area within the Home Islands -- bears mute testimony to the folly of
its militarist leaders.
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Nearly twice the
population of Japan.