The Cherry Trees Spared

Updated Sunday 15 May, 2011 12:18 PM

The Cherry Trees Spared

Naval possibilities post-WWI – Washington Revisited

This was inspired by a passing ‘WI’ from Chris, who asked what would have happened if Britain had retained the High Seas Fleet. I’d been thinking about what would have happened to the RN if there had been no Naval Treaties and decided that, in order for Washington [or something very like it] to be avoided, the nation most opposed to enforced naval equality needed a bargaining chip. Chris gave me the perfect starting point, the HSF. Let’s say that Adm. Reuters, commander of the interned fleet, had no orders to scuttle the fleet. Historians argue about this all the time, I haven’t found anything definitive either way. However, instead of acting on his own authority as in OTL, he contacts what’s left of Fleet HQ first, saying he intends to scuttle the fleet if he receives no orders within a week [the fleet had had no contact with Germany since January 1919]. A mid-level placeholder panics and gives definitive orders to do nothing. By means of the British inspectors at Kiel, the British become aware of the fleet’s narrow escape.

At this point there are several possible courses for the UK to take. The official line in OTL was that a separate conference [which became Washington] would decide the fate of the HSF, after Versailles was finalised. I doubt that Lloyd George would allow this; he needs something to bargain with against Clemenceau and Wilson. Besides, Churchill, back at the Admiralty [by handwaving, say he was so impressed by the possibilities of the new ships that he insisted], wants new toys. Lloyd George promises Clemenceau a large proportion of the captured German fleet; better ships than France has ever built. Wilson, separately, is assured that Britain will not expand the tonnage of the RN by new construction or commissioning captured ships. He expressly does NOT promise not to do so, just that the fleet overall will not expand. Much of the negotiating that was OTL carried on in Washington is instead done at Versailles, but with Britain in a more commanding position the effective terms are: Britain not to expand the total tonnage of the RN for 15 years [can’t afford to anyway]; France to receive 5 battleships and 1 battlecruiser; Italy 2 battleships, 1 battlecruiser, Japan and USA 1 battleship each. Other ships are left to the disposition of the RN, light units all destroyed or sold to third-rate fleets. In order to convince the USA to accept this offer, occupation of the Rhineland is ended immediately, reparations are more reasonable than OTL [the British entitlement takes the main cut] and all German possessions in the Pacific are a joint mandate between Japan and the USA. The Japanese are Not Happy about this, but can’t really do anything about it yet. In fact, nobody is very happy, Britain can’t really pay for the fleet she’s just bought, the USA has lost the chance to rule the waves cheaply and France isn’t getting many reparations. Italy is the only power really satisfied with the outcome.

Despite being effectively broke, the major navies, without a legal limit on expansion, manage some new building. The RN scraps no less than 30 pre-dreadnoughts, 9 dreadnoughts and 4 battlecruisers, reducing the Effective List to 8 battlecruisers [2 German] and 19 dreadnoughts [2 German]. The scrap profit, plus the re-sale of Canada and Agincourt to Chile and Brazil respectively, pays for the construction of three heavy battleships [G-class OTL, scrapped on the stocks after Washington]. At 48,000 tons they are the most powerful in existence. Ambitious further plans are dropped on financial grounds, as are those of the US, which manages to lay down three Lexington-class battlecruisers [not converted to carriers ATL] but is forced to abandon the 8-8 Program shortly after. Out for revenge, the Japanese begin work on a fleet to match the USA or UK in the Far East; two heavy battleships, two battlecruisers and extensive refits to the IJN’s other units. The ‘dream plan’ calls for a further six battleships but even the general staff don’t believe they can pay for them. The Continental powers can’t afford the fleets they have already, so France and Italy agree not to expand their fleets for 10 years from 1922. An interesting side-effect is that the Versailles terms for the German Navy stand; vessels are limited to 12000 tons and ‘coast-defence ship’ is not defined. This is the least of the Weimar Republic’s problems. Aircraft carrier research is practically non-existent outside the UK, where the OTL force of 3 Courageous-class converts plus Eagle and Argus is passed from Admiralty to Air Board to Ministry of War ad infinitum. The Japanese, however, have a few ideas on the subject and construct a proof-of-concept vessel, the Hosho of 25000 tons. Their main limitation is a lack of aircraft – they use second-hand British types even more useless than those deployed by the RN. Essentially, the focus on battleships slows development and deployment of carriers, as does the lack of spare hulls in the early 1920s.

All this work has little political effect through the 1920s except between Britain, Japan and the USA. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is a dead duck, but the US is displeased with Britain and thus retreats even further into isolationism than OTL. The lights are on but as far as Europe can tell nobody’s home. This plus increased naval spending means that the European economies are even worse off in the Twenties, but suffer less from Wall St. There is very little prospect of two of the ‘Big Three’ combining against the other. The late 1920s see no change, except that the RN is forced to retire the two oldest battleship classes [8 ships], selling four King George V– class to Argentina [2], Chile and Spain. Meanwhile, Mussolini makes a state visit to the UK and is struck by the 1^st [and only] Carrier Group, consisting of Furious and Glorious, making a dummy strike on an ex-German dreadnought, which is sunk as part of Fleet exercises. The effect is quite deliberate – to intimidate Il Duce into being cooperative over unspecified future plans in Africa, possibly involving war with France. It doesn’t quite work – Mussolini returns home demanding carriers yesterday. A fast liner is converted to Leonardo da Vinci, the first Italian aircraft carrier, in record time.

In 1930 Germany announces the Panzerschiffen, which are exactly as OTL except due to the different limits the real tonnage is admitted. Everyone is less scared than OTL [as their fleets are stronger and the Germans don’t look like they’ve done the impossible]; the French build only one Dunkerque as a reply, trusting to their powerful cruiser force. Italy is also more quiet than OTL; the carrier is joined by two new BBs but their completion is endlessly delayed. Germany, as OTL, ‘replies’ to the Littorios with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in 1934, as Raeder’s best efforts to convince Hitler pay off. Hitler doesn’t want a navy; after all, the first one fought one battle, hid in port and ended up augmenting the enemy forces. To match all this battlecruiser-building, the RN gives Tiger, the last pre-war BC, a full rebuild and sends her to the Med with the two ex-German BCs as a demonstration of force. Only the RN has the capacity to keep its ex-German ships truly battle-worthy; spares are short and the original specs usually unavailable. Ex-HSF units in the RN receive first refit priority; everything that can be replaced, is. Submarines, meanwhile, are neglected; the RN refuses to encourage a threat to commerce and battleships, of which it has more than anyone, the Continental powers lack money, the US finds them short of range and the Japanese have little experience. The largest sub fleet as of 1936 is Italy’s, with Britain and the US close behind.

With so many powerful fleets-in-being, tensions are inevitable and come to a head over the Abyssinian Invasion by Mussolini in 1935. He has already made himself unpopular by laying down the massive Littorio-class in 1934, especially with France, in the midst of desperate depression [worse than OTL as less reparations to prop up economy in 1920s]. The 3^rd Republican government under LeBrun decides that a great foreign-policy coup will restore French pride and confidence. Italy, with a weak army and navy, is an obvious target. The League of Nations refuses to impose sanctions on Italy over the invasion, so France [with secret, later denied, British backing] does so unilaterally, announcing a blockade of the Italian forces in Swaziland and Eitrea. Normandie, Dunquerque, Bretagne and her sister ship Provence, plus a powerful cruiser force are dispatched for close blockade of Port Asmara, arriving on October 28^th. Within three days, two Italian ammunition ships have been seized and all Italian transports in the Med have diverted to Libya or home. The operation appears a complete success. In order to make the lesson stick, the French decide to move up to blockading Libya until the Italian army [which has plenty of supplies] is removed from Abyssinia altogether. With the Suez canal closed to Italian shipping, no great force is necessary to keep up the blockade of Eitrea; two cruisers are left to cover the port. The remaining ships take station off Tripoli.

As might be expected, Mussolini is not pleased by this turn of events. In a burst of martial ardour he orders Admiral Cavagnari, commander of the Home Fleet, to sail to Tripoli and break the blockade with 4 battleships [missing 3 ex-Germans immobilised by lack of ammunition and the Iulio Cesare in refit], the carrier da Vinci and any other forces necessary. Whilst the Fleet is en route Mussolini is struck by the thought that the French will launch a pre-emptive strike, as he knows they have British support. He decides to launch one first, presumably in an unusually stupid moment. Cavagnari is faced with a choice between certain national suicide [the French Army would eat the Army of Savoy for breakfast in a full-scale war] and direct orders from his Leader. As a compromise, he decides to send in his carrier group, expecting it not to do enough damage to provoke war whilst satisfying Mussolini that his wonderful carrier idea is being put to good use. As nobody has thought about how to get 29 aircraft [Ca-5 biplane fighter-bombers, broadly equivalent to the USN’s SBC-4] off the deck fast enough that the first don’t run out of fuel waiting, only 21 depart, with 240kg bombs but no torpedoes. The strike is incredibly successful – the French ‘know’ that nothing can reach them and are sublimely confident until the bombers are within range. The Italian dive-bombers press home their attacks to the end, taking 24 losses, mainly due to being unable to pull out of dives in time or to running out of fuel. On the other hand, the French lose the powerful cruiser Suffren and will later declare Provence a constructive total loss. For 48 pilots and 24 aged bombers the Toulon Fleet has lost half its strength in battleships [Dunquerque and Bretagne being drawn from Atlantic Fleet] plus the newest and largest cruiser in the French Navy. Japanese and British observers look closely at the action, from opposite sides of the problem – the Japanese plan to do exactly the same, the British to make sure it cannot be done. The ‘war’ fizzles out due to a general lack of enthusiasm. The French Army could smash Italy in short order, but anything less than total victory would be a disaster – would Hitler be deterred by an army which couldn’t beat Italy? This last is little comfort to Mussolini, who apologises profusely [if not sincerely]. Furthermore, there is a general spirit of pacifism on both sides, strong enough to make even a victorious Continental war political suicide. Admiral Cavagnari is reprimanded for ‘excessive zeal’ and put in a distant post.

New ideas are rampant after the Tripoli Raid; every navy is to some extent shaken up. The Italians are delighted and promptly begin work on a second carrier, but little more. The French, seeing the need to smash Italy sooner or later, build up their army in the south and lay down three new battleships [OTL Jean Bart a year early]. They see aircraft as hopelessly vulnerable to flak, so air defence is preferred to carriers. AA cruisers are rushed out and the battleships are festooned with extra AA mounts on every open surface, including on top of Dunquerque’s ‘A’ Turret [they mounted one there OTL in the postwar refit, thankfully they never fired ‘B’ forward whilst it was manned]. The RN starts planning in earnest for fleet air defence, more or less abandoning attack aircraft [rightly seeing that Swordfish would be slaughtered by a prepared fleet] until a decent torpedo-bomber, i.e. fast and able to carry a 21in torpedo, is developed. The need for a real fleet defence fighter is paramount; what results is the bastard son of a Blenheim and a Hurricane, hideous and rather slow when fully loaded with fuel, but long-ranged and manoeuvrable. The Storm is in service within two years of the initial requirement, unfortunately it proves impossible to take off from the slower carriers and is restricted to the Courageous-class and the newly-ordered pair of Ark Royal-class fleet carriers. Again, air defence is a priority; the Dido-class AA cruisers receive high priority and capital ships are given not only AAA but air-search radar; the first ever used at sea. Enormously heavy, requiring calm weather and unreliable, it is fitted only to HMS Medusa and HMS Rodney, the two largest warships afloat. Japan is inspired to begin work on a more reliable ‘alpha strike’ method, involving massive waves of aircraft dropping torpedoes. Unfortunately they have only one carrier. An instant solution arrives; convert four heavy cruiser hulls to light carriers. This is only the stopgap for the IJN’s masterpiece, the planned super-battleships due to lay down in 1937. At the request of Admiral Kondo, the first pair of a planned four are converted to carriers; at 60,000 tons the largest ships ever built. The indigenous aircraft capability has been steadily built up to the point of being able to provide useful bombers, so the fleet will, barring accidents, be ready by 1942 with 7 fleet carriers and 14 modern battleships, plus two more giants ready by 1944. The numbers are unimpressive next to the RN’s 8 and 25, but every ship will be modern and powerful; all but six completed since 1918. Hitler’s reaction is most astonishing. There will be a Kreigsmarine YESTERDAY! By Order! The Army is stripped of resources to get three battleships, two carriers and another Scharnhorst on the stocks ASAP. The Wehrmacht is correspondingly weaker in tanks and other heavy equipment; each battleship would use as much steel as a year’s worth of Panzer IIIs. The USA has become so isolationist that nobody really notices the construction of two carriers in the mid-30s, the steady refitting of the fleet or an extremely large budget for land-based torpedo bombers and point-defence fighters. With Congress refusing to look west of Hawaii or east of Rhode Island, the fleet cannot build new ships, but air defences for bases are unobjectionable enough. Pearl Harbour, Manila, Samoa et al are filled with naval aircraft which, just coincidentally, are designed for carrier deployment. The USN may not have any carriers, but it can pack the hulls of any it can get.

As in OTL, Hitler is moving to war. The prospect of land war leads to the RN being left to its own devices by politicians focused on the RAF and Army. Churchill is recalled to the Admiralty in early 1938 and told to keep out of the way. He does so by stripping every fleet bare and filling every RN dockyard for the first time in half a century. With no time to build new ships, every possible improvement is to be made to what’s available. The remaining pair of Queen Elizabeths, three Revenges, both Badens and Hood, as well as the entire BC force, are in for the biggest possible upgrades, as are the Medusas and carriers for minor work. With no help from America likely to be forthcoming, all new construction is devoted to CLs and destroyers; the cost of maintaining so many capital ships has hurt the light forces badly. The French navy is all but abandoned in the rush to get some sort of army ready, as is the Italian. Hitler insists on keeping up work on his fleet whatever else happens; the army is in such a weak state [compared to OTL] that the Czechs think they might be able to hold off the Wehrmacht. Although Munich goes as in OTL between Hitler and the Allies, the Czechs refuse to sign the surrender and mobilise their army.

America’s isolation has not sat well with idealists. The unprovoked aggression against Czechoslovakia leads to many Americans volunteering to fight for liberty, freedom etc. Roosevelt, desperate for a wedge against the isolationists, agrees and provides the volunteer brigade [actually c.12000 men] with motor vehicles and some artillery. They leave from the West Coast, as the only nations that will guarantee safe conduct are the British and Romania [once sat on by the US and UK; some European ally is necessary for the brigades to actually reach the war and the King was very anti-Nazi]. The volunteers intend to pass through the Suez Canal and up through the Bosporous to Constanta. However, Hitler has got wind of the entire plan. Knowing that if he kills 12000 Americans he will be at war with half the world at the wrong time, he asks the Japanese if, in return for technical assistance to their army and air force, they will intern the American transports at some point between Hawaii and Australia. Very dubiously, the Japanese accept.

The transports Liberty Bell, Republic, Paul Revere and Justice are halted by the Japanese and forced to divert to the Marianas. Roosevelt and the American public are outraged, more by Germany than Japan. The American position is that they do not want to fight Japan. If necessary, they will mount a raid to recover the transports, but the Japanese military and civilians will expressly NOT be targets. Essentially it is treated as a matter between the US and Germany in which Japan is an unwilling dupe. This is insulting to Japanese pride, which demands that it is better to be enemies than to be beneath notice, not even worth destroying. The Japanese armed forces are made ready for war as the US prepares a raid with cruisers and Marines from Manila. Britain backs the US line, also refusing to treat Japan as an enemy. The fleets are at sea, the Czechs’ backs are to the wall [the Germans, after demanding the Sudetenland, have yet to react to the unexpectedly negative answer], the volunteers are sitting on their ships waiting to die or go home and nobody is even nearly ready for war.

The story might or might not continue, I’m very busy currently so it’ll be a while.

High Seas Fleet – Units Interned,

Battleships

Bayern – 15in guns x8, 24kts

Baden - “ “

5x Kaiser-class: 12in guns x10, 21kts

4x Konig-class: Improved armament layout, as Kaiser otherwise

Battlecruisers

Moltke – 11in guns x10, 25kts

Seydlitz – 11in guns x10, 26.5kts

Von der Tann – 11in guns x8, 27.5kts

Derfflinger – 12in guns x8, 28kts

Hindenburg – 12in guns x8, 28.5kts

Light Cruisers x8, generally inferior to British, all with 8x5.9in guns & c.27kts

Small Destroyers x42, undersize and undergunned but fast.

Fates ATL:

Bayern, Baden, Derfflinger, Hindenburg to active service, RN

Von der Tann to RN, tested to destruction

Seydlitz, Konig-class to France, active service

1x Kaiser-class to France, tested to destruction

2x Kaiser-class, Moltke to Italy, active service

1x Kaiser-class to Italy, tested to destruction

1x Kaiser-class to USA, tested to destruction

ORBATs 1936:

*Medusa [G3] x3: 9x16in, 28kts, very heavy armour

**Devastation [ex-Bayern] x2: 8x15in, 24kts, original German guns replaced by British-pattern 15in from Courageous-class and scrapped monitors.

**Queen Elizabeth x5: 8x15in, 25kts, refits continuous 1932 onwards

^Revenge x5: 8x15in, 22kts, minor refits 1929 on

*Hood: 8x15in, 32kts, reconstruction 1936

Iron Duke x4: 10x13.5in, 21kts, minimal refits, Ready Reserve

~Tiger: 8x13.5in, 29kts, comprehensive refit 1934

@Renown x2: 6x15in, 30kts, v.weak armour, moderate refit 1933

~Inflexible [ex-Derfflinger]: 8x12in, 28kts, both German BCs retain original weapons, of which plenty kept from other captured HSF vessels used as targets etc.

~Indomitable [ex-Hindenburg] : 8x12in, 28.5kts

Courageous x3 : <33 aircraft, 32kts

Argus : <18 aircraft, 21kts [training ship]

Eagle : <22 aircraft, 24kts

@Hermes: <18 aircraft, 25kts

* = 1^st Battle Squadron

** = 2^nd & 3^rd Battle Squadrons [deploy together]

^ = On foreign stations, for use as mobile reserve in wartime.

~ = Mediterranean Squadron, BCs

@ = Far East Station

Carriers as follows: Hermes Singapore, Eagle, Furious, Glorious Home Waters, Courageous Mediterranean. Argus as training ship, Gibraltar.

To avoid confusion with the OTL Nelson, the G3-based ships are Medusa-class, not Nelson.

USN

Florida x2 : 10x12in, 20.5kts

Wyoming x2 : 12x12in, 20.5kts

New Mexico x3: 12x14in, 21kts, full rebuild 1930

New York x2 : 10x14in, 21kts, full rebuild 1931

Nevada x2 : 10x14in, 21kts, improved layout and armour, rebuild 1932

Pennsylvania x2 : 12x14in, 21kts, repeat N with 2 extra guns, rebuild 1933

Tennessee x2 : 12x14in, 21kts, enlarged, more armour, improved guns, rebuild 1934

Colorado x3 : 8x16in, 21kts, identical to T except 16in guns, refit 1935-7

Lexington x3 : 8x16in, 33kts, large & fast but weaker armour than Hood.

Langley : <22 aircraft, 24kts

Marine Française

Courbet x3: 12x12in, 21kts, v.poor layout

Bretagne x3: 10x13.4in, 20kts, repeat of C hull except larger guns & removal of B turret

Normandie : 12x13.4in, 21kts, commissioned very slowly in late 20s although launched early WW1; 3 more never finished.

Gloire [ex-Konig] x4 : 10x12in, 21kts, efficient armament but unreliable due to lack of German spares.

DuQuesne [ex-Seydlitz] : 10x11in, 26.5kts, rarely at sea as no other prewar German 11in guns extant thus spares short

Dunkerque : 8x13in, 29.5 kts, brand new 1936, light construction but excellent overall design

Bearn : <28 aircraft, 22kts, converted Normandie-class along lines of Eagle. Suffers badly from lack of suitable aircraft.

Regia Italia

Cavour x2 : 10x12.5in, 21.5kts, newly rebuilt

Andrea Doria x2, 10x12.5in, 26kts, also rebuilt

Caracciolo : 8x15in, 29kts

Leonardo da Vinci : <30 aircraft, 24kts

Colombo x2 [ex-Kaiser] : 10x12in, 21kts, lack spares & no refit, obsolete

Condotti [ex-Moltke] : 10x11in, 25kts, same problems as DuQuesne for France

Imperial Japanese Navy

Kongo x4 : 8x14in, 30kts, newly refitted 1933

Fuso x2 : 12x12in, 22.5kts. also newly refitted & regunned 1932-4

Ise x2 : 12x12in, 25kts, received same refit as Fuso 1934-6

Nagato x2 : 8x16in, 26.5kts, last in line for refits as completed 1918-20

Kaga x2 : 10x16in, 26.5kts

Amagi x2 : 10x16in, 30kts, deficient armour compared to Hood or Lexington

Hosho : <30 aircraft, 24kts

Kreigsmarine

Deutschland x3 : 6x11in, 28.5kts, as OTL, more ultra-heavy cruisers than battleships

Scharnhorst x2 : 9x11in, 32kts, not yet complete

Pommern x2 : 4x11in, 10x7in, 20kts, pre-dreadnought coast-defence ships, refitted with new secondary armament 1927

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