Please click the
icon to follow us on Twitter.Writing
recently here about the possibility of Belgium never being created I was
reminded of the various counter-factual geo-political aspects I included
in my steampunk story, 'The Skyborne Corsair':
http://rooksmoor.blogspot.com/2008/12/skyborne-corsair-chapter-1-steampunk.html
One was the continuation of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands as late
as 1865 and the other was that Italian unification had been incomplete
leaving three states: Padania, i.e. unified northern Italy, the Papal
States of the central Italian peninsula and the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies (which for ease I had retitled 'The Sicilian Kingdom') covering
southern Italy and Sicily. Giuseppe Garibaldi has been left as a
terrorist living in Tunis planning to bring these three kingdoms
together. Of course, in our world by 1861 most of Italy had been unified
and following the exclusion of French influence from the country during
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, the remaining Papal held areas were
united with the country and Rome became the capital.
In today's posting I am going to look at the possibilities of Italy not
become a unified state in the mid-19th century and what would have been
the differences for subsequent history. Though the process of the
unification of Italy is usually dated as starting in 1850, as with the
unification of Germany, the seeds of the process can be seen as being
planted by Napoleon's conquest of large parts of Europe. Italy was
the first region in which he began reorganising the geo-political
arrangement, creating republics which were either ruled directly from
France or were effective puppet states modelled on the post-revolutionary
French model. Later these tended to become kingdoms, often dished
out to his relatives or generals to rule. Napoleon's earliest
victories despite pushing Austria from northern Italy, then restored its
status to the eastern side of northern Italy by giving it Venice; a move
that was reconfirmed after Napoleon was defeated in 1815. Austria
was to rule Lombardy and Venetia, covering north-eastern Italy until 1866;
the Austrians would hold Trentino sitting between these two provinces
until 1919. Under Napoleon Rome was to become ruled directly from
France. The attempts to exclude Austria from northern Italy and
break the connection between France, the Papacy and Rome were two key
elements of the unification process. Garibaldi first appears in the
unification process in 1849 fighting to defend the short-lived Roman
Republic from the French. Defeat there gave the city back to the
Papacy. The year 1848 saw uprisings across Europe all of which
sooner or later were put down by conservative forces. In 1850 the
Austrians finally suppressed the uprising in Venetia, the province in
which Venice sits. Thus, despite the ructions of 1848-50, the first
attempts of Italians to throw off Austrian or Papal control had failed.
Italian States in 1850
The state that drove unification was the Kingdom of
Piedmont-Sardinia. This had been created in 1720 when the Duke of Savoy
was raised to be King of Sardinia. In 1799 the French conquest of
northern, the king relocated from his capital Turin to Sardinia.
In 1847 the region of Piedmont was united fully with Sardinia to form a
single kingdom. Conte Camillo Benso di Cavour became prime
minister of Piedmont-Sardinia in 1852 and as Otto von Bismarck was to do
in Prussia in the following decade, he used the basis of a regional
power which ruled over some of the main industrial areas of the country
as the basis for unifying the state. As in Germany, unification
can be portrayed as much as an annexation of weaker states of a similar
national background following the exclusion of other Powers, in both
cases Austria and France, from the region.
Thinking of the time favoured the nation-state, i.e. a country in which
the people tend to speak the same language and have much the same
culture. Western Europe had a number of states: Britain, France,
Spain and Portugal that were already like that in the early 19th
century. However, in central Europe you had the fragmentation of
states speaking the same language (or at least a similar language) and
in eastern Europe you had the vast multi-national Austrian, Russian and
Ottoman empires. Throughout the 19th century the concept of
nationalism, which has seeds as early as the 1810s, for example, the
rallying of Prussians to fight Napoleon, was developed politically and
culturally. As literacy improved the development of dictionaries
and the regulation of dialects help to provide a basis for nationalist
aspirations. Furthermore in the industrial age it appeared that
the petty states of 18th century Europe stood no chance against either
the nation-states in terms of industrialisation or the multi-national
empires in terms of military power unless they combined.
In 1858, in league with the French, Cavour provoked unrest in Lombardy
and the following year took Piedmont-Sardinia to war alongside France
against the Austrians. For the French this had the benefit of
weakening its main rival on continental Europe and to some degree taking
back the concessions that Napoleon had made to the Austrians. The
Franco-Piedmontese victory gave Lombardy to Piedmont-Sardinia and as
happened following Bismarck's victory against the French in 1870, other
states began adhering to the victorious regional power: the Duchies of
Parma and Modena plus Tuscany joined with Romagna, Umbria and the
Marches, formally parts of the Papal States in the United Provinces of
Central Italy. However, rather than creating a rival to
Piedmont-Sardinia, the constituents of this briefly existing state
offered themselves to Piedmont-Sardinia in 1860 and were annexed.
Piedmont-Sardinia also took Within two years, Cavour had more than
doubled the size of his state, though it came at a high price. To
keep French backing, Savoy, ironically the original home of the rulers
of the kingdom and the region around Nice, had to be given to France and
were only briefly retrieved by Italy 1943-5. The willingness of
Napoleon III ruler of France to assist the objectives of
Piedmont-Sardinia in exchange for quite minor gains, was vital in the
achievement of Italian unification.
The second phase of the unification was driven more by Giuseppe
Garibaldi, who was more focused on unification for the benefit of
Italians than for the rulers of Piedmont-Sardinia. His invasion of
Sicily in 1860, aided ironically by the British who had in the
Napoleonic period had been good friends of the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies, brought southern Italy into the unification process.
Garibaldi's successful fight to Naples ended the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies and the ruler of Piedmont-Sardinia, Victor Emanuel II, felt
confident enough to declare himself King of Italy in February 1861.
To some degree the fact that unification owed more to regional and
international Powers rather than 'freedom fighters' was emphasised in
1862 when trying to bring the Papal States into the growing Italy,
Garibaldi was arrested on his way to Rome. Garibaldi tried again
in 1867 but failed once more. Rather than make a direct attack at this
stage, Victor Emmanuel (Cavour having died in 1861 aged only 50; it is
interesting to imagine what would have happened in this phase if he had
lived say another 10 years) negotiated with Napoleon III to have French
troops leave Rome by 1866. In contrast to pushing the Austrians
from northern Italy, the French were more reluctant to see the end of
Papal control of central Italy. Though the French troops left in
1866 they returned in 1870 when Garibaldi again tried to take Rome and
were only pulled out when France needed them for defence against
Prussia.
Piedmont-Sardinia certainly benefited from the activities of Otto von
Bismarck and his wars to bring about German unification in 1864-70.
Piedmont-Sardinia entered the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 on Prussia's
side, being promised Venetia if they were victorious. Despite the
Prussians winning, ironically, the Austrians gave Venetia to the French
who had not intervened on Prussia's side against their old rival
Austria. Generously, the French gave it to Piedmont-Sardinia.
This meant that only the Trentino region remained in Austrian hands
which it would do until it was given to Italy in 1919 at the Paris Peace
Conference after Italy had entered the war on the side of Britain,
France and Russia against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Papacy
did not give up its remaining territory in western central Italy without
a fight, but having been denuded by the losses in 1860 and surrounded
since 1861 on three sides by 'Italy' there was little the Pope could do
once French troops had gone, though there was some fighting. The
Pope represented himself as a prisoner in the Vatican City, which
remained a sovereign state even though only 0.48 ha large and it was not
until the Lateran Accords of 1929 that the Papacy was reconciled to
existence of the Italian state. Interestingly the Papal States
and Britain were the only two theocracies in Europe, with their head of
state also being the head of their established church, now only Britain
and the Vatican City remain in this category.
A plebiscite in September 1870 decided that the remaining area of the
Papal States would join Italy. The Italian capital, which had come
from Turin to Florence in 1865 moved to Rome in 1871 where it was to
remained. Of course, the process of unifying the country culturally had
only just begun. I remember a historian telling me years ago that
it was reckoned only 20% of the people living in the new Italy actually
spoke Italian as we would recognise it. Even today Sardinia alone
has a plethora of dialects which seem ancient in their roots. In
large parts of north-eastern Italy, German was the language. It
took hard work and a national education system to unite the language of
the country and even now, 140 years, on regional dialects remain strong.
In the space of 12 years the patchwork that had been the states of the
Italian peninsula and islands had been made into a single state.
Despite the glamour of Garibaldi's campaigns, the unification was
actually achieved through deal making in particular with France.
Even Garibaldi's progress needed British assistance. The one
aspect in which Garibaldi's forces made a key difference was in fact in
July 1866 when, following the defeat of Victor Emmanuel's forces at
Custoza the previous month, Garibaldi's troops were able to defeat the
Austrians at Bezzecca and move on to occupy Venetia. Now, it seems
likely that Venetia would have gone to France and then to
Piedmont-Sardinia anyway, but it was a moral victory for the Garibaldian
forces to actually conquer Venetia themselves. Without this
perhaps France would have thought twice about giving over the province
so easily.
What then are the possible different outcomes of these 12 years that
would have led to Italy not becoming a unified state? One key
element appears to be the role of France. It seemed to bend over
backwards to assist the growth of Piedmont-Sardinia. A lot of this
is due the Napoleon III's delight in geo-political manoeuvrings across
the world. It was clear that a strong Italian state would be a
buffer against France's key rival Austria. However, Napoleon III
may have easily disappeared from the picture. Though elected
President of France in 1848 he seized dictatorial power in a coup in
1851 and was overthrown in 1870 following France's defeat by the
Prussians. If he had lost power sooner or had been more
preoccupied as he should have been with defending against Prussia
perhaps he would not have had the time or inclination to intervene in
Italy. A particular reason may have been the attempt by Italian
revolutionary Felice Orsini to assassinate Napoleon III in January 1858.
In his attempt he threw three bombs at the emperor's coach and killed
eight people and wounded 142 others. It seems clear that a little
more luck on his part or bad luck on the emperor's could have led to his
death or severe wounding and perhaps a very different approach to
Italian affairs.
Without French backing, I imagine that Cavour would still have
engineered a war against Austria for the sake of annexing at least
Lombardy, say, in 1860. However, as happened in 1866 there was no
guarantee that Piedmont-Sardinian forces could defeat the Austrians.
A defeat or less than conclusive victory would not only have barred
Piedmont-Sardinia from receiving Lombardy, but would also have had an
impact on the central Italian states which came over to that side in the
light of clear success and strong French backing for the move.
Perhaps there would have been a sustained war between Piedmont-Sardinia
and Austria. This naturally in itself would have been in French
interests as long as Austria was not too successful. Even today
the region of Piedmont has only 4.4 million people and Sardinia 1.7
million, both would have had far fewer in the 19th century. In
contrast, Austria-Hungary had 52 million people in 1914 and though it
would have had fewer fifty years earlier, it would have still been able
to call on far greater resources than Piedmont-Sardinia fighting alone.
Thus, it is easy to envisage that without French support,
Piedmont-Sardinia would have struggled to push the Austrians from
nothern Italy. They may have ultimately victorious but given the
record of both armies, it seems more likely that a stalemated war would
have developed without the sweeping victory Cavour needed.
If Piedmont-Sardinia had not been as successful as it was in our world,
would the states of central Italy have adhered to it so
enthusiastically? Perhaps the United Provinces of Central Italy
would have lasted longer. Of course, in time, there is a good
chance of this unit forming a confederation with Piedmont-Sardinia, but
perhaps that would have been on a more equal basis rather than
assimilation by Piedmont-Sardinia. Even Prussia did not absorb all
the other states in the way that Piedmont-Sardinia did. Would the
eastern parts of the Papal States have adhered to this grouping or
remained under the Papacy. It seems apparent that there were many
in the Papal States who though happy to follow the Pope in spiritual
matters were seeking a different structure for political life. If
Piedmont-Sardinia had been snubbed by France and certainly if it had
been defeated by Austria then perhaps the UPCI would have formed the
basis for a rival focus for unification with Italy becoming more of a (con)federal
state than it did become.
Success in the North allowed Garibaldi to go to the South to bring the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies into the growing 'Italy'. If the
Austrians were still strong in the North it has to be questioned whether
he would have been able to shift his focus. Despite a vote to become
part of Italy 1861-5 saw numerous uprisings in the former kingdom
leading to more deaths than all the other conflicts of the unification
and even talk of a 'civil war'. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was the
least developed area of Italy with less than 200Km of railway and with
the bulk of its settlements without permanent roads. However,
taxes were low and food cheap. Emigration from the kingdom was
common especially to the USA and Argentina. As some northern
Italians argue today, there was little benefit in assimilating this poor
region into Italy. Workers from the region could migrate North to
work in factories and on the land anyway, there was no need to take over
an area which needed such development. It seems quite possible
that less romantic fighters than Garibaldi may have concentrated on the
North and Centre of Italy and left the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies
alone. The British had propped up the kingdom at the time of the
Napoelonic Wars and though it would have been unlikely that they would
have taken over the state they may have had a similar relationship to it
as they did with Greece after its independence in 1829, perhaps holding
some islands or ports. The kingdom probably would have developed
slowly like neighbouring Greece and from 1813, Albania. Perhaps
control of it may have provoked a wider European war as did the tension
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary in 1900s-10s.
Despite the fact that Pope Pius IX (Pope 1846-78) granted the Papal
States a constitution it is clear that the Papacy wanted to retain
control over the provinces they held in central Italy. He was
advanced in his approach to modern technology and oversaw improvements
in the infrastructure of his state, but in 1869 he oversaw the
declaration of papal infallibility and his educational policy was very
conservative. It seems highly feasible if Piedmont-Sardinia had
been distracted by an enduring Austrian presence in the North and if the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had remained independent too, let alone if
the French had not been compelled to withdraw their forces, the Papal
States could have continued. It seems likely that if it had
reached the 20th century intact it would have remained so up until the
present day. I anticipate there would have been a development in
the secular side of the state as the Papal States would have needed the
trappings of a modern state, but it would have remained a particular
kind of country. Perhaps ultimately it would have come to resemble
Saudi Arabia which holds the religious sites of Islam and yet is
not automatically the leader in the Islamic world. Perhaps it
would have been difficult for Popes to separate their spiritual role
from being head of a state. Pius IX was certainly bitter about his
loss and before 1929 Catholics were supposed not to engage with the
Italian state because it had stolen the Pope's lands.
Would any of the four Italian states have engaged in colonialism the way
Italy did in our world? Austria-Hungary had enough issues with its
own internal empire, which continued to grow, for example, taking over
Bosnia in 1908, without looking overseas. However, in the late
19th century and early-mid 20th century Italy did seek to establish an
empire, in large part to prove it was an equal of the other Powers, much
the way other newcomers Germany and Japan did. Taking advantage of
the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and the Egyptian Empire, which in
effect was under British control anyway from 1882 onwards, in 1882 Italy
took the Bay of Assab in what is now Eritrea. The Horn of Africa
would be one of the two main regions of Italian penetration. In
1885 Italy took more of Eritrea and established Italian Somaliland
farther South. Italy invaded Abyssinia, what is now Ethiopia,
briefly in 1889 and in a treaty with the Emperor, established Eritrea as
a colony. The Italians invaded Abyssinia again in 1895, but were
clearly defeated in 1896. In 1901 like the other Powers, Italy
managed to get a concession in China, in its case Tientsin, close to
Beijing. Italian troops took part in the lifting of the Siege of
Beijing in 1905. In 1911 Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire
and seized Libya and the Dodecanese Islands with their primarily Greek
population. Despite British wishes that these islands go to
Greece, Italy retained them until the end of the Second World War.
After the First World War, Italy was given Jubaland by the British in
1925 and it became part of Italian Somalialand the following year,
extending the border South. Italy finally conquered Abyssinia
1935-6, but only held it to 1941 when the British captured it and the
emperor was restored, effectively the first decolonisation by a European
colonial power since the 18th century.
In 1939 Italy made Albania into a colony. It was repulsed from
Greece in 1940 but occupied much of the country following the German
invasion of 1941. In addition Italy received the Dalmatian coast
and regions bordering Albania from the break-up of Yugoslavia by the
Germans that year. Italy had Savoy and Nice returned when France
surrendered in the summer of 1940 and following the German occupation of
Vichy France in 1942 Italy took over Corsica which had been Italian up
until 1764 when France had bought it from the Republic of Genoa.
The Italian invasion of Egypt of 1940 was a failure and despite the
intervention of the German Afrika Korps, by 1943 the Italians had been
expelled from North Africa. Italy lost all its imperial
territories at the end of the war. Like almost all colonial
territories held by the Powers, the Italian empire was more of a burden
than a benefit to the ruling country. Around only 180,000 settlers
left Italy to live in its empire, this compares to 655,000 who emigrated
to the USA 1890-1900 and 2.1 million who went there 1900-10, though 40%
of these people later returned to Italy; 4.192 million moved to the USA
1820-1920; of the current population of Argentina, over 200,000 have
ancestry in Italy.
Would any of the four Italian states have engaged in the imperial
adventures? Whilst the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies may have seen a
need to reduce over-population, it lacked the resources even to fight in
Eritrea let alone the Ottoman Empire, and given the relatively free
emigration to the Americas there would seem little point. It is
more likely that Piedmont-Sardinia, frustrated at the failure of the
unification process would look overseas and probably to the same
locations as Italy did in our world. Given how difficult it proved
for the Italians to defeat even African opponents (despite the use of
aerial bombardment in Libya in 1911 and dropping poison gas on Abyssinia
in the 1930s, just like the British were doing in Mesopotamia (now Iraq)
at that time), it is unlikely that the smaller Piedmont-Sardinia, nor
UPCI, would have been any more successful and instead it may have been
limited to economic penetration of Greece and Albania. The Papacy
naturally backed Catholic missionaries across the world and it seems
likely that their 'imperial' policy would have remained with this
approach.
Let us assume that with the failure of Cavour's project and Garibaldi
being a little less lucky than he was, and in fact, because of the
continued Austrian presence in northern Italy, never invaded Sicily,
that we arrive at 1914 with five states in Italy: Austrian-held lands in
the North-East, Piedmont-Sicily in the North-West, United Provinces of
Central Italy, the Papal States and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
By now Lombardy and Venetia might not even be considered Italian by
anyone bar Italian nationalists and German would be the dominant
language. In our world, Italy was in the Triple Alliance with
Germany and Austria-Hungary from 1882 onwards. Italy had been
angered by the French conquest of Tunisia in 1881 which it had hoped
would be its colony, lying such a short distance from Sicily. When
war broke out in 1914, however, Italy reneged on the alliance and the
following year entered the war on the side of Britain, France and Russia
in the hope of gaining Trentino, Istria and the Dalmatian coast from
Austria-Hungary. The war between Italy and Austria-Hungary was
pretty inconclusive but with the collapse of Austria-Hungary in 1918
Italy was given southern Trentino but lost out on Istria and the
Dalmatian coast. Bitterness over this was one of the factors that
aided the rise of to power of Fascism in Italy from 1921 onwards.
It seems unlikely that any of the five small Italian states would have
entered an alliance with either side before the First World War. Given
how much difficulty the different nationalities in Austria-Hungary (what
Austria had become from 1867) caused for the multi-national empire, the
Italians may have been among those causing tension and perhaps, given
the history of the Italian nationalist terrorists, it may have been an
Italian assassinating a member of the Austro-Hungarian royal family,
rather than a Serb, who triggered the First World War, perhaps earlier
than it occurred in our world.
Assuming the war broke out as it did in our world, perhaps the Kingdom
of the Two Sicilies would have favoured the British, but remember right
up to August 1914 it was uncertain whether the British would even enter
the war. However, once it they may have used the kingdom as base
for actions against Austria-Hungary, though ultimately they used Greece.
Given the British focus on knocking out Germany's weaker allies, in our
world, primarily the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary may have been
attacked in Lombardy and Venetia. Of course, it would have been
very tempting to Austria-Hungary to knock out Piedmont-Sardinia for good
or expand into the UPCI, but whilst it defeated Serbia quickly, the
difficulty it faced fighting Russia would have predicated against
opening an additional front unnecessarily. It does seem possible
that once underway Piedmont-Sardinia may have allied with France with
the hope of knocking Austria-Hungary out of Lombardy and Venetia at
least. It is likely the war would have been as undecisive as in
our world, but that Piedmont-Sardinia would have been given the
provinces in 1919 or could have seized them on Austria-Hungary's
collapse anyway.
Interestingly we may have seen Italian unification beginning in the
1920s. It was the era of 'self-determination' with the revival of
Poland and the appearance of Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on the basis of nationality grounds, or at
least similar nationality groupings. Romania grew immensely taking
on Transylvania, more than doubling the pre-war country. Even the
losers, Austria and Hungary were left with states which equated more to
a nation state than before. Of course, nationality lines (I do not
use the word 'ethnic' because I would argue that despite the harsh
'ethnic conflict' we saw in the 1990s when Yugoslavia dissolved, the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes have the same ethnicity, it is a variation in
culture that really distinguished them, e.g. Catholic/Orthodox/Muslim
and using the Latin or the Cyrillic character sets), are never tidy and
a great deal of the difficulties in the 1920s-40 and in the 1990s
stemmed from the messiness that comes with human settlement.
Certainly I would easily envisage a northern Italian confederation
coming in the 1920s if this had not happened before. The stumbling
block would be the Papal States and I think both Pope Benedict XV
(1914-22) and certainly Pius XI (1922-39) renowned for his
anti-Communism, would have been resistant to any attempt to take over
their lands.
Piedmont-Sardinia may have been far more content with what it received
at the end of the First World War than Italy was. It would have
faced the challenge of encompassing more German speakers into its
territories, but the growth in size of the state may have headed off
some of the tensions that led to the rise of Fascism. The Italian
states would have faced the same challenges from Communism 1918-20 that
other states of central and eastern Europe did and it is likely that as
in all of these, this would have been defeated. Perhaps the Papal
States troops would have interveneded to ensure revolutionaries were not
successful. Given the experience of all of the states East of
Italy in our world, it seems most likely that by the end of the 1920s
both Greater Piedmont-Sardinia, its confederation partners of UPCI and
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies would all be under a dictatorship.
The most likely model seems to be a monarcho-fascist one (though of
course without Fascism being established in Italy we would call it
something else) which Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and in effect
Hungary, all adopted during the 1920s-30s. Austria went down the
path of clerico-fascism which is another model that parts of Italy may
have adopted. Of course, it was de facto, what the Papal States
would have had anyway and this may have given heart to clerico-fascist
regimes appearing in Austria, Spain and Portugal.
It seems likely that both Piedmont-Sardinia and the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies would have ended up in some semi-friendly relationship with
Nazi Germany the way Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania
did and have supplied troops to fight on the Eastern Front.
Perhaps Slovakia is the best example, because, it seems likely given how
many German speakers there would be in Lombardy and Venetia after an
additional 80 years of Austrian rule, Hitler would have wanted to absorb
these regions into Germany as he did with Austria and the Sudetenland
region of Czechoslovakia. He went on to make Bohemia-Moravia a
protectorate, which may have been the fate of Piedmont-Sardinia with the
UPCI states becoming the equivalent of Slovakia. However, the
relationship between the Italian states would certainly not have been as
close as that between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in our world.
Piedmont-Sardinia, assuming it remained an ally rather than a
protectorate may have been allowed to take parts of southern France,
possibly Corsica, certainly after 1942. The key difference to our
world is that none of the Italian states would have really been in a
position to attack Greece or Egypt. It is likely the Germans would
still have gone into Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941 to impose rule in the
former and keep the British out of the latter, but it is unlikely there
would have been any intervention in North Africa. Perhaps Rommel
would have been sent to conquer the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies when in
1942/3 the British and Americans threatened to invade Sicily from
Tunisia.
Pope Pius XII (1939-58) was not like Pius XI who signed an accord with
Hitler, but he seems to have found it difficult to find what he felt was
the right balance in dealing with the Nazis, not wishing that regime to
begin widespread persecution of Catholics let alone himself being
arrested or deposed in favour of a more Nazi-friendly Pope. It is
interesting to wonder if his stance would have become more robust if the
Germans had sought to occupy the Papal States when taking over the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1942/3 and that resistance to the
invasion would have pushed him into more active opposition to the
Germans. Given the resistance to the Italian unifiers it seems
likely that foreign invaders would have received at least as strong
opposition. Would the Pope have fled, and if so, where?
Portugal? The USA? Interestingly, what would have been the
attitude to Jewish refugees in the Papal States especially those of
Italian origin? In our world the Vatican City was not occupied,
but would the Germans have treated a larger state differently?
In the post-war world, the Italian states would probably have been
restored to their situation in 1939. Given that the Italian
monarchy was abolished in 1946 following a popular referendum, it seems
likely that this would have happened in Piedmont-Sardinia and the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies too. Perhaps, especially in the
latter, there would have been a civil war between Royalists and
Communists as happened in Greece 1944-8. It seems likely that the
Allies would have encouraged a confederation of the Italian states or
even a federal state (they were popular in the 1950s). Again the
difficulty would be the Papal States, especially if the rest of Italy
had become a republic. Possibly the region around Rome would
remain distinct and be like a large version of the Vatican City of our
world. To some extent it would depend on how Pius XII had behaved
during the war, but I doubt none of the Allies, bar the USSR would have
dared tamper with the Papacy, especially if the Pope had made a good
showing against the German occupation or pressure. Generally, as I
noted above, I think if the Papal States had survived into the 20th
century we would still have them now. The rest of Italy, as in our
world, presumably with its capital at Florence, would be bolstered as an
anti-Communist state in the Cold War and would be part of NATO.
Most certainly it would have become part of the ECSC, EEC and the EU
that followed. The Papal States, by now, would probably have a
similar relationship to the EU as Switzerland does.
Overall, it does seem feasible that an incomplete unification of Italy
would have occurred. The impact would have meant quite a few
differences especially to the course of the two world wars, and to some
extent, even the language we use. The key difference it seems,
would have been to those people whose countries were invaded in the
construction of the Italian Empire. It seems likely that Libya and
Italian Somaliland would have been divided between the French and
British and Abyssinia probably left alone as one of only two independent
states in Africa. The Dodecanese Islands would have gone to
Greece, most likely in 1913 when Crete left Ottoman control or, if not,
in 1920/23 as a result of the peace treaties. In Europe, the major
difference appears to be the persistence of the Papal States and the
implications of a religious leader also running a state with its own
economy and military and particular take on diplomacy. However, it
seems most likely that it would be rather like Switzerland in its
aloofness from much of the political-economic developments of post-1945
Europe.