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      icon to follow us on Twitter.In the generalized waste and slaughter 
      that was a world war the Burma front 43-45 has to rank among the more 
      wasteful. Taking Burma made sense for Japan. It cut Chiang’s supply line 
      through Rangoon [although this became redundant with the successes of the 
      initial Japanese naval-air attacks; there was simply no way even after 
      Midway the allies could have forced convoys through to Rangoon in the face 
      of Japanese surface and air attack]. 
      
However the multiyear British effort to retake Burma was a major push 
      to nowhere.  The UK had promised its South Asian dependencies 
      independence after the war.  So Churchill’s wish to erase the 
      memories of Singapore aside, it was a push to nowhere for no special 
      reason beyond inertia and imperial pride.  Let us presume that when 
      British 14th Army is formed its tasks are defending India and providing 
      cover for FDR’s silly Ledo Road and China fixations [ending those requires 
      a FAR more elaborate ATL].  What changes?
      For the crucial years 1943-44 you only free up two British infantry 
      divisions.  The Indian and African divisions would have been needed 
      to defend India and the Indian-US-Chinese road construction group building 
      the silly road to Stillwell’s Chinese-American forces in far north Burma.  
      Indeed in the very short run the two British divisions will probably have 
      to be replaced with 3-4 more African colonial divisions [the manpower for 
      these was available if anyone could have found a use for them and the Free 
      Polish Forces had enough surplus officers to stand them up].  However 
      in addition to the two divisions one frees up a corps worth of landing 
      craft tied up in the Arakan campaigns, enough transport aircraft to double 
      what was in the Med and enough shipping to support an additional army [a 
      defensive force covering the mountains of eastern Assam takes FAR less 
      shipping than supporting offensives over those mountains into Burma].  
      Again what changes?
      First Churchill’s Aegean Campaign in 1943 now has enough shipping and 
      amphibious lift to avoid the disasters of OTL.  Instead the British 
      get a firm lodgment in the Aegean and take the Peloponnesus.  Odds 
      say they don’t make it past Corinth [a natural bottleneck] but between the 
      two they can besiege Crete.  Probably the Germans will refuse to be 
      starved out but the use of Crete as an airbase ends.  Germany will 
      pull out planes it cannot get fuel to.  The gain on convoy air 
      attacks not made in turn pays for the campaign.
      Second an extra corps worth of amphibious lift means Anzio goes in with 
      four divisions in the initial wave instead of two.  The silly plan 
      still may not work but it now goes from absurd to a die roll.  There 
      is now a 40-50% chance that the German line is unhinged and falls back 
      past Rome.  IF that happens Italy drains off reserves from Ukraine 
      and France at a crucial time.  Even if it doesn’t you don’t get the 
      hell that was Anzio before Diadem ended the problem the following spring.
      Third [the big one]: the extra landing craft and shipping mean the 
      Provence landings can go in with Normandy instead of later.  This is 
      worse for the forces landing in Provence who will have to contend with 
      three first rate German mech divisions instead of one as in OTL.  
      However it means Normandy will have to deal with two fewer which may just 
      get Monty to Caen before the lines harden.  In OTL every mech 
      division in France except one was pulled to fight in Normandy and most 
      were thrown in against the Empire.  Here Adolph the Idiot must split 
      forces.  The man was never very good at setting priorities leaving a 
      possibility that refusing to retreat anywhere he loses everywhere.  
      Too many contingent factors to be sure but likelihood is a war shorter by 
      2-3 months.
      As for Churchill’s prestige victory – in point of fact no one in the 
      East noticed that Burma had been retaken as the British gave it up within 
      the year.  So there pretty much is no downside.  The worst case 
      is the Japanese prove more skillful than OTL and knock the British out of 
      Assam.  This is a net plus for the allies as it ends FDR’s silly 
      China campaigns and frees US 14th Air Force for deployment elsewhere.