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Singapore
1942 Introduction
Everything happened fast on the 16th
January 1942. Not only had Percival resigned after having being blamed for the
loss of Kuala Lumpur to the Japanese advance, but Bennett immediately issued new
orders for battling the Japanese. Churchill, thoroughly ignorant of the
situation on the Malay Peninsular, had earlier abused Percival over the phone
charging him with all sorts of claims. Percival, believing that he had lost the
confidence of the Prime Minister, resigned shortly thereafter. General Wavell,
the new regional commander, was then given the task of replacing Percival. At
first this was Heath, but that was now impossible. No other senior general was
around, so command would fall to one of the major-generals. Although Bennett was thus a junior general, he was nevertheless Wavell’s immediate choice. This had come about due to Wavell’s previous experience with Australians at Tobruk. At Tobruk, Major-General “Ming the Merciless” Moreshead & his 9th Australian Division, had denied the important port & town to the German General Rommel. In doing so, Moreshead served Rommel his first major defeat. As it appeared that another siege was about to take place, this one being Singapore (an extremely vital island & port for the British), Wavell decide to give command to another of these Australians. If he had known, however, about Bennett’s constant bickering with his British seniors, not to mention his bickering with some of Bennett’s own staff, then it is possible that a different commander may have been chosen. But then again, Singapore may have fallen to the Japanese. Trouble
on the Peninsular “The attack on Singapore occurred
almost at the same time as Pearl Harbour. By December 9th 1941, the
RAF had lost nearly all of its front line aeroplanes after the Japanese had
attacked RAF fields in Singapore. Any hope of aerial support for the army was
destroyed before the actual attack on Singapore had actually begun. Britain’s naval presence at Singapore was strong. A squadron of warships was stationed there lead by the modern battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse. On December 8th 1941, both
put out to sea and headed north up the Malay coast to where the Japanese were
landing. On December 10th, both ships were sunk by repeated attacks
from Japanese torpedo bombers. The RAF could offer the ships no protection as
their planes had already been destroyed by the Japanese. The loss of both ships
had a devastating impact on morale in Britain. Sir Winston Churchill wrote in
his memoirs: ‘I
put the telephone down. I was thankful to be alone. In all the war I never
received a more direct shock.’ Only the army could stop the Japanese
advance on Singapore. The army in the area was lead by Lieutenant General Arthur
Percival. He had 90,000 men there – British, Indian and Australian troops. The
Japanese advanced with 65,000 men lead by General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Many of
the Japanese troops had fought in the Manchurian/Chinese campaign and were
battle-hardened. Many of Percival’s 90,000 men had never seen combat. At the Battle of Jitra in Malaya
(December 11th and 12th 1941), Percival’s men were
soundly beaten and from this battle were in full retreat. The Japanese attack
was based on speed, ferocity and surprise. To speed their advance on Singapore,
the Japanese used bicycles as one means of transport. Captured wounded Allied
soldiers were killed where they lay. Those who were not injured but had
surrendered were also murdered – some captured Australian troops were doused
with petrol and burned to death. Locals who had helped the Allies were tortured
before being murdered. The brutality of the Japanese soldiers shocked the
British. But the effectiveness of the Japanese was shown when they captured the
capital of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, on January 11th 1942.” (This entire OTL passage is a direct quote from The Fall of Singapore, by C. Trueman, History On the Web. Web address: http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/fall_of_singapore.htm Change
in Commander If the loss of the Royal Navy ships were
bad enough, the loss of Kuala Kumpur only made matters worse. Up until now
Percival had followed Singapore’s governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, orders to
“play by the rules”. This was now about to change as drastic situations
called for drastic solutions. Nothing so far had stopped the Japanese advance.
Something had to be done, not only to slow the Japanese down, but stop them. It
was with this conclusion that Percival ordered a “Scorched Earth” policy.
His aim was to ensure that there would be nothing of value for the Japanese use
whilst on their advance on Singapore. If nothing else, he reckoned that the
Japanese would stave to death, & the Allies could simply sit & wait in
Singapore. Although the Scorched
Earth policy may have been welcomed by the troops under him, it was not
at all appreciated by the civilian population who would lose everything. Nor was
the “wait in Singapore” tactic popular with many of his officers. Bennett in
particular saw it as defeatist & above all merely invited the Japanese to
attack Singapore. “My all means” Bennett argued as he was prone to do
“deny everything useful to the Japanese, but let us fight them on the
Peninsular. If we get stuck in Singapore it’ll turn into a siege & we’ll
eventually lose.” Percival rejected Bennett’s advice. But for Percival, it would not matter
overly much what he now thought or who he took advice from. Churchill was not at
all impressed by the results of the Singapore campaign to date. In fact he
thought that it was nothing more than a disaster. After a heated discussion
between Churchill & Percival, Percival resigned believing that he no longer
held the confidence of the Prime Minister. It was the one observation, out of
the entire Singapore campaign, in which Percival
was right. The decision to replace him, though, was
not an easy one. General Wavell, who had himself been recently replaced from the
Eastern Mediterranean Command, had to find a replacement immediately for
Malaysia. Having come to respect the abilities of the Australians during the
siege of Tobruk, Wavell decided to give command to the Australian Major-General
Bennett. This coursed a bit of a stir at the Malaysia Theatre of Operations
headquarters as there had been much animosity between Australian 8th
Division & Headquarters. Nonetheless Bennett soon arrived along with much of his own staff. Some of Percival’s people were replaced, which did not at all help the atmosphere between the British & Australian personnel, but more essentially Bennett got immediately to work. The first order, which the new commander gave, was “We’ll do a Wellington!”. No one, apart from the Australian staff, had a clue what he meant. The
Wellington Line
The Batu - Mersing Line, or its more
referred to (albeit unofficial name) Wellington Line, was a desperate venture
brought upon the Allies by the tactics of the Japanese. The Japanese flanking
manoeuvres, which had been their main strategy to date, had been highly
successful. More to the point, they had been the main reason for the Allied
retreat so far. But Bennett, with a major change in strategy, reasoned that by
establishing a true defence line across the Peninsular, he would have a Lines of
Torres Vedras & do to the Japanese what Wellington did to the French. Although Bennett had order it, for the
most part, the Wellington Line was nothing like the Lines of Torres Vedras. In
some parts the Line was nothing more than a river. In other parts it was a road.
Nonetheless, such geographical features were essential if the Wellington Line
was to be successfully held. Thus, from west to east, the Line began at Batu
Pahat. From here, it followed the south bank of the main inland river which
flowed most of the way to Keluang. Only a small section of the Line was
actually constructed from scratch (in this section) linking the town of Keluang
to the river. Along the southern river bank, though, a crude pathway was
constructed with a sentry post established every mile. Importantly, at locations
of concern, defensive works were constructed, which along this section of the
Line, meant the area around Batu Pahat, Tongkang Pechah, Air Hitam & Keluang
(among others). This construction duty fell to the 4 000 troops of 44th
Indian Brigade & about 6 000 Native labourers. Continuing east, the Keluang - Kangkar
Kenggor Road was utilised as the next section. Although widening the clearing
around the road was essential, digging a trench & building other defensive
works along the road was even more of a priority. Lucky, the 18th
British Division of 15 000 troops, a recent reinforcement to the Peninsular, was
at hand & was given this task immediately. The British would have about
twelve days to complete their section of the Line. The final section of the Wellington Line
was also the hardest to construct. Unlike elsewhere, only part of a river
flowing inland from Mersing could be utilised. The rest of the Line had to be
carved out of the Malaysian countryside. This unthankful duty fell to the
machine gun & engineer battalions of the 8th Australian Division,
2 500 troops in all, about 2 500 Naval & Air Force personnel brought up from
Singapore, & a further 7 000 Native labourers. Like elsewhere, the troops
would have about twelve days to build their section of the Line. This was
further complicated by the fact that two primitive bridges had to be
constructed: one over the river a few miles east of Kangkar Kenggor & the
other about 10 miles south west of Mersing. Even though the Japanese continued with
their advance, Allied resistance had slowed them down. This was just as well
considering the hurried work being conducted on the Wellington Line. Bennett
knew this had to be done, but also knew that the more determined defensive
effort currently under way was nothing more than a well conducted retreat.
Having said that, some units were given the go ahead for offensive operations.
The highly experienced Dutch Marechaussees were given the orders to make havoc
in the rear areas of the Japanese. Thus, along with Chinese guerrilla units, the
Marechaussees did exactly that. To his dismay, Yamashita had to keep a
considerable number of Japanese troops behind the front lines in order to
provide security. As such, the Japanese advance was further slowed down by a
week. On 31 January 1942, Bennett declared
that the Wellington Line was ready. In reality it was far from ready, but enough
had been done for it to be fully manned. The rest could be completed by the
troops themselves as they waited for the Japanese. As a result, the necessary
orders went out to the troops. Those Allied forces involved with rearguard
actions with the Japanese would now break contact & quickly retreat. They
would then take up their positions along the Line or in support of it. Hence, from west to east, 9th
Indian Division took over the Line from Batu Pahat following the river inland.
Although the Indians concentrated their forces at the various prepared defensive
positions, they still had to send out patrols along the river bank. As the Line
stretched inland, the 9th Indian Division met up with the 18th
UK Division centred around Keluang. The 18th Division had been in
place for some time now & had grown to know the area, albeit still in a
limited fashion (53rd UK brigade arrived two weeks before the rest of
the Division). The 18th Division would thus defend Keluang & the
Keluang - Kangkar Kenggor Road section. Of all the sections of the Line, though,
the 18th Division’s section was the best prepared. But then it had
to be. Bennett assumed rightly that Keluang would probably become the key factor
in Japanese efforts. The 18th Division would have a tough fight on
its hands. And just in case they needed help, the now very experienced 11th
Indian Division would be placed in support behind the British. Manning the final section of the Line
was the 8th Australian Division. It would be responsible for the
defence of Mersing & the inland part of the Line ending at Kangkar Kenggor.
Even though the eastern part of the Peninsular had seen fighting, it was on a
lessor scale than in the west. Nonetheless the 8th Division could
expect a heavy attack. Just to ensure that the Australians (who had been
fighting the Japanese alone until now) held their part of the Line, the 45th
Indian Brigade was ordered to support the Australians & was hence placed to
their rear. Finally, the 44th Indian Brigade, which had been working on the western part of the Wellington Line, & the two Malay Brigades who had stayed in Singapore, would be the last resort. Bennett deployed the 44th Indian at Johor Baharu. In doing so it would provide rear area security for the Line. It could also support either 11th Indian Division, its sister 45th Indian Brigade, or the 1st & 2nd Malay Brigades. The latter two brigades would remain in Singapore itself to ensure that any Japanese attempt at taking the island, by a deceptive amphibious operation, could be dealt with. The February Battles The first Japanese patrols discovered
the Wellington Line on 2nd February around Mersing. Yamashita,
however, did not know what to make of the intelligence reports coming from his
scout units. At least the Japanese had at least discovered where the Allies had
gone. It had all been rather strange. For all of the way down the Peninsular,
the Allies had at least kept up a rearguard action. But three days ago they had
broken contact & disappeared. Now the reconnaissance reports said that the
“British [sic] were manning strong points and defence works”. After further
Japanese reconnaissance, it was discovered that there was far more to the Allied
positions than merely strong points. Yamashita, not knowing of the change in
command, realised all the same that a drastic change had taken place in Allied
strategy. At first Yamashita decided to continue
with the current strategy. The Japanese would attack the strong points in order
to judge the defence. If this defence was rather strong, then a flanking
manoeuvre around the strong point, by a small force, would inevitably force an
Allied retreat. This strategy had been successful so far in the campaign &
there was no suggestion that anything would change. Yet at this point, Yamashita
had no indication whatsoever as to the extent of the Wellington Line. And the
Line was deliberately built in order to stop the Japanese flanking strategy. Thus from the 3rd of
February, various small scale battles began around Mersing. At first these were
limited to Mersing itself, but they soon spread out as the Japanese tried to
find a hole in the defences. This was further complicated by the fact that this
part of the line was based upon the river which flowed inland from the town. The
result was that no Japanese units got any further than the southern river bank.
Most attacks where repulsed long before the attacking Japanese even got to land. The repulses, however, only forced the
Japanese to move their probes further inland. By 8th February the
Japanese had probed further west & had discovered, early on in the piece,
probably the weakest point of the Wellington Line. Understandably, yet still not
comprehending the full situation, Yamashita decided to attack this section: the
part of the line somewhat isolated between the two rivers (Kanguar Lenggor &
Mersing) on 8th Australian Division’s front. Yamashita decided to throw an entire
division at this weak section, yet RAF reconnaissance saw the movement of
troops. Bennett, although realising that this was merely the opening move,
decided to ensure that the Japanese could not gain a breakthrough. As a result,
he ordered the 45th Indian Brigade to reinforce the Australian battalion manning
this part of the Line. When the Japanese attacked on the 10th
February, there were more than enough troops to hold them back. Attacks went on
all day, but the Commonwealth Forces never broke. Even though attacks would
continue in the eastern sector throughout February, the Japanese were, for all
intense & purposes, worn out by their major attack on 10th
February. Furthermore, the focus would shift to the west, where the bulk of the
fighting to date had already taken place. By the 5th February,
the main Japanese force on the western side of the Peninsular began to
bump into the Wellington Line around Batu Pahat. Immediately it was obvious that
any crossing of the waterway here would be close to impossible. Nonetheless a
small Japanese raiding force tried to cross. It was defeated in the process.
Still not knowing the extent of the Line, Yamashita ordered patrols to probe for
the flank of the defence line. After several small clashes with the Indian
forces, these scouting patrols eventually reached Keluang & the British
sector of the Line. By the 12th February,
Yamashita had more or less realised that he faced a major defence line that was
deliberately designed to stop his tactic of outflanking his enemy. Having
already attacked heavily on the eastern part of the Line & repulsed,
Yamashita decided that the centre around Keluang was probably the weak point.
Thus from the west, he transferred all but one of his divisions &
concentrated them around Keluang. On the 15th February
Yamashita’s attack in the centre began. Backed by light tanks, the Japanese
broke the Line at Kampong Sembrong to the east of Keluang. Immediately upon
hearing of the situation, Bennett rushed up the 11th Indian Division
to counterattack the Japanese. Furthermore he moved two battalions from the 8th
Australian Division to Kampung
Kahang Baharu in order to relieve the two British Battalions stationed around
this area. These two British battalions inturn counterattacked the Japanese held
section of the Line around Kampong Sembrong. The fighting was savage, especially on
the 16th February when the Allied counterattack had gotten into full
swing. By the 17th February, however, the Japanese were held by the
11th Indian Division & were in serious trouble. Not only had the
British held onto Keluang in dreadful fighting, but the two British Battalions
attacking towards Kampong Sembrong had almost closed the breach. If this was to
happen, then the Japanese Division being held up by the 11th Indian
Division would be cut off & destroyed. The fighting on the 18th
February went no better for Yamashita & was just as savage. Japanese
reinforcements, meant for Kampong Sembrong, got mixed up in an attack by the
British out of Keluang. Consequently, the Japanese at Kampong Sembrong ended up
being surrounded. Furthermore, this meant that the Japanese facing the Indian
11th Division was cut off as Yamashita had feared. In order to save his trapped
troops, Yamashita fought his way to Kampong Sembrong again with all his
reserves. Add to the mayhem of battle, the cut off
Japanese division facing the Indian 11th Division, turned around
& fought its way back to Kampong Sembrong . It was a confused & chaotic
fight which lasted all day. British troops on several occasions had to fire to
their front & rear as Japanese attacks came at both sides of the Line. Some
of the cut off Japanese division made it to Kampong Sembrong, but most of the
Japanese troops did not. All the reserve troops managed to do was to merely add
their numbers to the Kampong Sembrong defenders. Bennett, though, was not satisfied with
the results of the 19th February & now ordered that the Japanese
be thrown out of Kampong Sembrong. But like Yamashita, Bennett did not have much
of a reserve. The 18th British Division were more or less exhausted,
the 8th Australian Division were stretched & facing constant
small raids all along their section, & the 9th Indian Division
faced a similar situation as the Australians. Bennett had, though the 11th
Indian Division, which although had seen action, were still somewhat in a
fighting spirit. Still, just to cover himself, Bennett ordered the 44th
Indian Brigade to move up from Johor Baharu to Rengam & support their fellow
countrymen. Bennett’s attack on the 20th February was horrendous. The Japanese at Kampong Sembrong fought to the last. Numbering about 10 000 troops, the 15 000 Indians suffered greatly. Only after using the combined artillery of the 11th Indian & the 8th British Divisions did the Indians finally make any headway. Finally, though, by 18.00 hours, after fourteen hours of constant fighting, did the Indians finally secure the town & thus close the breach in the Wellington Line. The battle cost the Indians 6 500 troops. The Japanese were defeated. Siege Even though Yamashita knew that he was
defeated in his attempts to break the Wellington Line, his orders still stood.
His objective was Singapore. But the fighting around Kampong Sembrong had more
or less smashed his army. He requested from Tokyo for a further 50 000 troops
were by now were in limited supply. Japan was committed elsewhere & was over
stretched. The campaign in the Philippines was particularly taking large numbers
of troops, as were the various amphibious operations elsewhere. All Tokyo could
suggest was to start a siege of Singapore & stave the Allies out. This was harder than it appeared for
Yamashita. Nonetheless the Japanese dug in & decided to wait it out. This
was not necessarily a bad tactic as a similar one was being implemented in the
Philippines. There was though the concern, in the back of Yamashita mind, that
the Allies may attack & push the Japanese back. Having finally learnt that a
change had taken place in the Allied command, it was clear that the new
commander, Bennett, was far more aggressive than Percival. But unknown to
Yamashita, the Allied army was in no better condition than the Japanese. Unlike the Japanese, however, the Allies
had Singapore. And with the defeat of the Japanese on the Wellington Line, meant
that Singapore had some breathing space. Already, the balance of air power was
changing. By 10th February about 100 Hurricanes had joined the
defence, which added greatly to the twenty two surviving RAF Buffalos (out of an
original force of 170). Many would
come shortly thereafter & be further joined by
50 Australian & New Zealand Kittyhawks & some Dutch Buffalos.
Although the Japanese would still enjoy air power for all of the Singapore
campaign, their superiority had ended by the 10th February & by
1st March the balance had begun to swing towards the Allies. But the air power, nor the strength of
Allied ground forces, was not to be the major concern of the Japanese. This was
food. One decision which Percival had ordered on the 11th February,
the Scorched Earth policy, now started to make its presence felt on the Japanese
forces. Having consumed their own supplies by the 25th February, the
Japanese were soon starving by the beginning of March. Food supplies were sought
after, & found, but these were located far to the north. There was nothing
for the Japanese around the Wellington Line. The Allies, however, endured no such
supply problems. Singapore had stockpiles of food, & that which the Allies
needed, were brought from either India or Australia. Although the Japanese still
mounted air raids on Singapore & the merchant shipping heading for the port,
most of the supplies got through. It was only when the Japanese navy mounted
numerous raids into the waterways south of Singapore, did shipping become a
problem. Nonetheless, Allied naval forces tried to intercept the Japanese, but
the results did not always go the Allies way. During this time, the Dutch lost a
cruiser & a destroyer, the Royal Navy losing the same, whilst Australia lost
the cruiser HMAS Perth in an heroic
& desperate night battle whilst being outnumbered six to one. In April, though, & although the
Japanese navy may have had the upper hand on the seas, this soon changed due to
the deployment of a RAF Blenheim & Beaufort squadron & two RAAF Beaufort
squadrons to Singapore. Soon the Japanese Navy was facing the same treatment as
was suffered by the HMS Prince of Wales
& Repulse. Although no capital
ships were lost, the Japanese nonetheless lost three cruisers & four
destroyers within two days. Not being able to withstand such losses, the
Japanese naval forces withdrew to the South China Sea & out of range of the
Allied bombers. By the beginning of May, it was clear that it was the Japanese who were under siege on the Peninsular & not the Allies. Yamashita had lost all the advantages which he enjoyed only a few months before. The Allies had sat behind their Line & waited while his forces suffered from the effects of a siege. Although the Japanese supply situation had improved by mid April, reinforcements were limited. Furthermore, his numbers had not surpassed the numbers which he had in December 1941. And in order to just get to Singapore, he calculated that he would need double that number. Although a few Japanese raids were conducted along the Line, the Allied response was enough to tell him that any attack would fail. The Japanese further learnt that Allied numbers were increasing suggesting a possible offensive sometime soon. Aftermath The Allied counterattack for May had
been well planed by Bennett, but it would be fair to say that the offensive
ended up as nothing more than an advance following the Japanese retreat. Three
months of siege had proved Bennett right. The Japanese army could not hold onto
the Malay Peninsular indefinitely under the current conditions. They were slowly
haemorrhaging & starving to death. Even General Yamashita could now see that
the Allies had clearly established themselves behind their Wellington Line.
Furthermore the Allies just sat there & waited while his troops simply
suffered. Eventually in late May, Yamashita gave
the orders with withdraw north to a defensive position of his choosing. This
would become the Pahang River - Kuala Lumpur - Kelang Line. This line, however,
would be more of a curse than a blessing, but for the moment the Allies did
little to challenge this Japanese line as they did not have the strength to
breach it for some time. Importantly for the Allies, though, the Japanese
withdrawal gave them the advantage & allowed the Allies to build-up their
forces for a major November offensive. Alas for Bennett victory would not be
triumphant. Because of his junior rank, now that the situation on the Malay
Peninsular had drastically improved, it was decided that a Lieutenant General be
reappointed to the recently named Malay Peninsular Force. Although Bennett was
supposed to become commander of the ANZAC Corps (3 ZN, 7 & 8 AUS Divs), he
was outraged by the change in command. After arguing bitterly with General
Wavell, not only did he lose army command, but he would be fired from Corps
commander as well. To add insult to injury, Bennett was
sent back to Australia in June 1942. He would, however, become quintessential in
the Australian government’s decision to order the two remaining Australian
divisions in the Middle East to return to the Pacific region. These troops would
be used in the interests of Australia, especially when there appeared to be a
probable Japanese invasion threat to the country by late 1942. Back in Malaysia, however, on 28
November 1942 the Allies, now under command of Lt Gen Slim, went onto the
offensive. Reinforced by the 3rd
New Zealand (now Armoured) Division, 4th Indian Division, 7th
Australian Division (against Bennett’s advice), & the 43rd
British Division, the Commonwealth forces attacked the Kelang Sector. They
immediately opened a breach in the Japanese lines. This breach was then
exploited by the 3rd NZ Div & the veteran 7th
Australian Div. The entire Japanese line henceforth collapsed, which ironically
saved the Japanese Army. The Japanese managed, thus, to establish a new line
south of Ipoh. Here the Japanese managed to hold off all Allied attacks, but it
was obvious that little could stop a defeat. Although the Allies feared that Siam (Thailand) may come to the aid of the Japanese, thankfully for them, this was not to be the case. Soon after the establishment of the Ipoh Line, the decision to evacuate the Japanese Army was taken in Tokyo. By the beginning of the New Year, this had been completed with remarkable success. “They’ve done a damned Dunkirk!” claimed an outraged (now) Lt Gen Bennett to the Australian Prime Minister Curtin. The Singapore Campaign had finally concluded. FeedBack Form
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“The only thing Australians wouldn’t
steal is a red hot stove” declared an angry Lt Gen Arthur Percival. The
general, who had only yesterday resigned his command, had just discovered that
two Australians had “commandeered” the general’s transport on behalf of
the new commander of the Malaysia Theatre of Operations, one Major-General
Gordon Bennett. This was beside that fact that the Australian Bennett was junior
to other officers in theatre; namely Lt Gen Heath. It is he (Heath) who would
have normally received command. Alas for Heath (the commander of the 3rd
Indian Corp), he had been seriously injured two days previously from a Japanese
bomb during an air raid. So Bennett, hence, inherited the overall command of the
defence of Singapore.