The Winter Lions

Updated Sunday 15 May, 2011 12:18 PM

The Winter Lions

The point of divergence for this alternate history is that Hitler’s meteorologist was able to accurately predict the spell of clear weather that, in our time line, began over the Continent on November 21, 1939 and lasted for a little over a week. Good flying weather was a prerequisite for launching the attack in the West so this marks the earliest possible date, after the original November 12 date, when Fall Gelb could have been launched. There is also a presumption that Hitler was actually serious about attacking in the West in 1939. Opinions vary on this point, and we will never know for sure, but certainly Hitler’s words and actions suggest that he was sincere in his stated desire to attack with the least possible delay. The Germans had a reasonable amount of weather data from U-boats and other ships in the Atlantic although their information was patchy because the British were censoring any references to the weather from their radio broadcasts. Perhaps Hitler’s meteorologist need only have been a bit bolder in his predictions for this scenario to have become a reality. This account takes its title from the activities of the RAF Hurricane squadrons in France who would be eulogized by Churchill, in this alternate time line, as the Winter Lions.

On September 27, 1939 with the Polish campaign complete Hitler announced his decision for an attack in the West against the British and French armies. This was followed on October 9 by Fuhrer Directive No. 6 ordering preparations to begin for the attack. On November 5 the attack date was set for November 12 but this was postponed on November 7 because of the weather predictions. On the afternoon of November 18, Hitler’s meteorologist brought him a forecast for a period of clear and mild weather beginning from the November 21. That evening Hitler set A-Day for November 22 and ordered final preparations for the attack in the West.

The German plan for the invasion of France in 1939, code named Fall Gelb, was essentially a reprise of the Schlieffen Plan of 1914. German forces would sweep through Belgium and Luxembourg to bypass the fortifications of the Maginot Line and descend on the French army in the flat open country of Belgium and Northern France. This time the attacking forces would also cross the narrow strip of Dutch territory that extended south from the main body of that country in order to widen the attack front. There would be no attack on the rest of the Netherlands and it would be left to the Dutch to decide whether to consider themselves at war with Germany. The objective of the offensive was to engage the Allied armies and seize territory in Belgium and Northern France that could be used for the prosecution of the war against England.

The Allied commanders had correctly assessed the German intention to make their main attack through Belgium. They in turn deployed their best units on the Belgian border to meet this threat. Because Belgium chose to adhere strictly to her neutrality the Allies were prevented from moving into Belgium prior to the German attack. On September 26, orders were issued that at the onset of hostilities the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) would advance into Belgium to the Tournai area and the French 7eme Armee would advance on their left to form a defensive front along the Escaut River and Canal. This modest advance could be accomplished in a day. The new line would cover the West Flanders region of Belgium and the Belgian channel ports that the British were intent on keeping out of German hands. During October there was much discussion of a more ambitious plan to base the main defense line on the Dyle River thus protecting half of Belgium. The inter-allied Supreme War Council finally agreed, on November 17, to adopt the Dyle Plan and issued instructions to begin operational planning. This change in plan was preempted when the Germans attacked only five days later but resulted in considerable confusion in some units.

A vital element in the German plan was the Panzer force. Ten Panzer divisions were available on A-Day. The total strength of these divisions, just over 2400 tanks on November 22, concealed a shortage of tanks with 37mm or larger main guns which would prove to be the minimum effective caliber for tank versus tank combat. The 10 divisions mustered over 800 of the machine gun equipped Panzer I and about 1000 of the Panzer II with its 20mm main gun. The real responsibility for armored combat would fall upon the 120 Panzer III, 106 Pz 35(t), and 126 Pz38(t) tanks, all equipped with 37mm guns, and the 200 Panzer IV tanks equipped with 75mm guns. These were concentrated largely in 4 of the Panzer divisions with 1. Panzer counting 38 Panzer III and 40 Panzer IV, 6. Panzer counting 106 Pz 35(t) and 31 Panzer IV, 8. Panzer counting 126 Pz 38(t) and 14 Panzer IV, and 4. Light (designated 9. Panzer after January 3, 1940 and including Panzer Lehr) counting 40 Panzer III and 28 Panzer IV. None of the other panzer divisions could muster more than 13 Panzer III or 20 Panzer IV on this date.

German tank losses had been significant during the Polish campaign. The 1. Panzer-Division had lost 11 Panzer III and 16 Panzer IV from a starting strength of 26 and 56 respectively. The 6. Panzer-Division (designated 1. Light until September 12) had lost 7 of its 112 Pz 35(t) and a further 70 had suffered mechanical breakdowns that could not be repaired in the field. Overall the number of tanks written off as total losses during the Polish campaign amounted to 236 of all types from an initial force of 2859. Combat and mechanical losses, that were later repairable in the field or back in Germany, numbered several times higher than this. These repairs placed a burden on the factories that depressed the production of new vehicles for the remainder of 1939. Not all of these had been returned to their units by November 22.

French armored strength was considerably greater than the Germans, especially in tanks armed with 37mm or larger guns. Exact totals are difficult to reconstruct but exceeded 2000 modern gun armed tanks on November 22. Over half of these were dispersed in independent tank battalions that would be committed only piece meal into the battle. The most concentrated forces were the three D.C.R. armored divisions, each with a nominal strength of 90 Hotchkiss H-39 medium and 70 Renault B1bis heavy tanks. In various states of formation were three light mechanized divisions with nominal strengths of 80 Hotchkiss H-35 and 80 Somua S-35 medium tanks each. These divisions were still building up to their establishment strengths in 1939. Their initial impact on the battlefield would be hampered by a faulty tactical doctrine. The BEF had nothing more than machine gun armed tanks dispersed amongst the infantry units until well into 1940.

The Luftwaffe rapidly redeployed its units to the West after the Polish campaign and absorbed replacements for the operational losses it had sustained. Its order of battle included over 3000 modern aircraft. About one third of these were fighters with the most common type being the single engine Bf 109D (also referred to as the Me 109 or “Messerschmitt” in many Allied accounts). Just entering service was the Bf 109E with significantly better performance. For longer range escort missions the Germans relied on the twin engine Bf 110. Medium bombers groups were equipped with various models of the He 111 and Do 17. The Ju 88 would first enter service in January 1940. Rounding out the force were some 300 of the potent Ju 87 “Stuka” dive bombers which had achieved such tremendous success in Poland.

The French air force was very much a mixture of the old and the new. The great majority of their bomber squadrons were equipped with obsolescent aircraft. Only the few squadrons equipped with the newer Potez 637 or LeO 451 would be effective in the coming campaign. The fighter situation was slightly better with about half the squadrons equipped with either the Morane MS 406 or the Curtiss H-75A Hawk. Either of these could fight the Bf 109D on roughly equal terms but were out performed by the Bf 109E.

The British sent to France an Air Component of fighter squadrons and the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) with the light bomber squadrons. The fighters consisted of numbers 1, 73, 85, and 87 Squadrons on Hurricanes and numbers 607 and 615 Squadrons initially equipped with the obsolescent Gladiator biplane. A base unit was also established to receive numbers 46 and 501 Hurricane squadrons if required and in the event these flew to France on November 24, two days after the Germans attacked. The Hurricane would prove to have superior performance to the Bf 109D but found the Bf 109E a much tougher opponent. The other main elements of the RAF contingent were the 10 squadrons of Battle light bombers and 6 squadrons of Blenheim medium bombers of the AASF. With a weak defensive armament these would prove to be easy prey for the German fighters. All told the RAF fielded some 400 aircraft in France with additional support available from squadrons in England.

The ground forces in the West remained inactive for the first months after the outbreak of war, aside from a token French advance in the Saar region. The air forces saw more activity. Both sides flew regular reconnaissance missions. Interceptions and combats occurred regularly over both France and Germany. The Germans also violated Belgian air space on an almost daily basis. In a portent of things to come, the AASF Battle squadrons were often on the losing side of these encounters. On September 30 an entire flight of 5 was wiped out by Bf 109s of JG 53, which put an end to their unescorted missions for some time. A flurry of last minute reconnaissance activity on November 21 heralded the events to come and led to a number of aerial encounters. An He 111 was shot down into the North Sea by an 85 Squadron Hurricane and a Do 17P was downed over France by 73 Squadron. That evening all Allied forces went to a state of high alert.

In the predawn hours of November 22, small teams of Brandenburg ‘special forces’ seized three of the key bridges over the Meuse River and the Juliana Canal on the Dutch-German border. All of the remaining bridges were blown in time by the Dutch border guards. Nonetheless the Germans had prepared pontoon bridges and these were rapidly placed at all the crossing sites. The small Dutch forces in the southern most Limburg province withdrew as planned into Fortress Holland in the center of the country. By midday German units had reached the Dutch-Belgian border at Maastricht and points north.

From early morning, the Eben-Emael fortress guarding the Albert Canal on the Belgian border was subjected to successive waves of Ju 87 Stuka attacks by StG 2. These succeeded in destroying one of the two 75mm gun turrets and disabling the 120mm howitzer cupola. As German forces reached the Albert Canal north of the fortress and began crossing in inflatable boats, a continuous smoke screen was laid by artillery and pioneer units to prevent observation. Harassing mortar fire from the fortress, firing blind at suspected German positions, failed to disrupt the placement of pontoon bridges. By afternoon the Germans had sited a number of 88mm Flak guns where they could fire directly at the embrasures of the 75mm guns and these silenced most of the northward facing guns. German engineer teams infiltrated into the fortress from the north and west during the night, with assistance from smoke screens, and placed explosive charges that destroyed the remaining 75mm turret and a number of the smaller embrasures. By November 24 the Germans had moved their heavy artillery across the strip of captured Dutch territory and emplaced it within range. Fire was opened from four batteries including the 420mm heavy mortar of Artillery-Battery 820 and those portions of the fortress still holding out were shelled to destruction. Over the next days and weeks the same pattern of attack, with support from 4^th Army units, was repeated against each of the Liege and Namur fortresses until all of them had been reduced.

In addition to their strikes on the Belgian front lines, the Luftwaffe also struck at airfields in Belgium and France. Much of the small Belgian air force was destroyed on the ground. Raids against 47 airfields in France had mixed results. Many of these attacks inflicted little damage. The RAF escaped with only two Hurricanes and three Battles lost on the ground. The RAF Hurricane squadrons patrolled over the front and encountered many of these bomber formations, mostly flying unescorted. In one encounter, 73 Squadron shot 6 He 111s out of a KG 54 formation. Claims for the day totaled 40 confirmed victories, 25 of which can be matched to Luftwaffe loss records, in exchange for 9 Hurricanes, mostly struck by the bomber’s return fire.

Passing to the north of the Belgian fortress zone the German 2^nd, 6^th, and 4^th Armies of Army Group B with 37 divisions, including 8 armored swept into northern Belgium across the narrow tail of the Netherlands. South of the fortress zone the 27 divisions, including 1 armored, of Army Group A’s 12^th and 16^th Armies advanced into the densely wooded Ardennes region of Luxembourg and southern Belgium. Army Group C comprising 25 divisions in 1^st and 7^th Armies waited along the French border facing the Maginot line. The reserve force contained another 24 divisions including 1 armored (4. Light).

Late in the morning of November 22, the BEF began to cross the Belgian border. There were delays on the Tournai road where a Belgian customs official armed with a little wooden gate and a telephone held up the column for four hours. To their left the French 7eme Armee moved forward to a position along the Escaut Canal centered on Ghent. To the right of the BEF the French 1ere and 9eme Armees remained largely in their prepared positions in France. A screen of light units went forward to watch for the Germans and make demolitions at key points.

The delaying actions along the river lines gained the Belgians only a single days respite. German forces crossed the Meuse River and Albert Canal in strength during the night. On November 23, the Germans broke cleanly through the Belgian units at Maastrict and mobile forces began advancing westwards. The northern group of Belgian divisions held defensive positions behind the Albert Canal from Maastrict to Antwerp. The Germans aimed to cut these units off and prevent them from retreating to connect with the French and British. The 15th Panzer Corps (5. and 7. Panzer-Divisions) advanced through Tongres and Louvain and then swung north towards Antwerp. Simultaneously the 19th Panzer Corps (1., 2., and 10. Panzer-Divisions) advanced westwards to Wavre and then swung south with the intention of connecting with Army Group A in the Ardennes.

The RAF responded to the Belgian cries for help by sending the light bombers of the AASF to attack the Maastrict bridges and the advancing road columns. Unescorted and lightly armed, the Battles and Blenheims were chopped down in droves by the German anti-aircraft and swarming Bf 109s. The loss rate per sortie neared fifty percent and the bombing had little effect. After only a few days these unsustainable losses spelled the end of any effective ground support from the AASF.

The RAF fighter squadrons met with better success. Most German bombers continued to fly unescorted and the Hurricanes took their toll. The Hurricanes also came off well in several encounters with the Bf 110 fighters. Only the Bf 109 groups inflicted serious losses on them. Part of the problem was that the RAF was accustomed to patrolling in sections of 3 or 6 aircraft while the German fighters hunted in groups of 40 or more. The Germans also continued to bomb and strafe the Allied airfields with mixed results. The Hurricane squadron bases were fortunate to escape with only moderate damage and in one case the defending fighters inflicted serious losses on the bombers. As the battle progressed additional fighters rotated to France from England, sometimes as whole squadrons, more often as flights that attached themselves for a few days to a one of the French based squadrons.

The 7eme French Armee and the BEF did not initially react to the German breakthrough but further south the French 1ere Armee was still in some confusion as to whether the newly hatched instructions to advance to the Dyle River were in effect. Several of the armored and cavalry divisions probed forwards. Many would become so embroiled with the Germans that they had difficulties returning to their original lines. On the afternoon of November 25 the French 1ere D.C.R. unexpectedly met the advancing 1. Panzer-Division at Charleroi. The Germans reacted quickly and their tanks drove in amongst the French units. The action quickly became a confused melee. The lightly armed Panzer II tanks proved ineffective and even the Panzer III and IV had difficulties with the heavily armored Char B1. Tactical coordination among the French tanks was poor and their reactions were slow and uncoordinated. The Germans were able to selectively mass against smaller groups of French tanks and defeat them in detail. Losses were heavy on both sides. The next morning the French attempted a withdrawl as Ju 87s from StG 77 joined the battle. A number of the French tanks ran out of fuel and were abandoned on the field. The Germans had taken too many losses themselves to immediately pursue.

The Belgians, who had hoped to fight a delaying action on the Albert Canal before withdrawing to the Dyle River, found themselves surrounded and attacked from all sides. On November 27, lead elements of 2. Panzer-Division met the advancing 12^th army at Montherme closing the ring around the southern portion of the Belgian army. The Belgian army was trapped in northern and southern pockets that were gradually being compressed. On December 10, King Leopold asked the Germans for an armistice.

While the Belgians still continued to resist, the bulk of German Army Group B streamed through the Gembloux gap. After driving in the screening forces the Germans made contact with the French 1ere Armee’s main line of defense around Maubeuge on November 26. There was a brief pause to allow additional units to close up and then on November 28 the main assault began. The full weight of the Luftwaffe fell upon a narrow sector of the French lines and the Germans unleashed the tanks of 16^th and 41^st Panzer Corps (containing 3. and 4. Panzer-Divisions and 6. and 8. Panzer-Divisions respectively) for the breakthrough. The French artillery was silenced by the relentless dive bombing of StG 2 and StG 77. By evening the Germans had broken cleanly through the French line. Following units began to cutoff and surround the French divisions on the flanks of the breach.

On November 29 the 41^st Panzer Corps on the left reached the vicinity of Cambrai but the 16^th Panzer Corps advancing on their right had a sharp encounter with the French 2eme D.C.R. Neither division of 16^th Panzer Corps was well equipped with gun armed tanks and at first the French counterattack made good progress. Only the arrival of the anti-aircraft battery with its 88mm Flak guns broke the momentum of the French attack and forced it to withdraw.

Next day, November 30, the 41^st Panzer Corps continued its advance and reached Arras. The following infantry units were still far behind the charging tanks that had pushed a narrow corridor into the Allied rear. Worse for the Germans, the period of good flying weather had now ended. Low clouds and rain covered northern France. With their aerial reconnaissance blinded, both sides began to lose track of the progress of the battle. A state of high anxiety prevailed in the German headquarters over the safety of their exposed units. That evening Hitler called a halt to the advance until it could be reinforced. This would last for three critical days.

Churchill, representing the British cabinet, flew to France on December 1 and confronted General Gamelin, the French Commander in Chief. As Churchill would later recount the conversation he inquired of Gamelin as to the disposition of the French reserves. Gamelin replied, “There are no reserves.” With the stark realization that the gap in the lines could not be closed the British made the only possible choice and began the retreat from Flanders. The British 5^th Division, just arriving in France, was moved to the area of St Pol to slow down the Germans when they resumed their advance west from Arras. Leaving their lines and much of their equipment the BEF and the French 7eme Armee withdrew from Belgium towards the Channel coast and then southwards around the point of the German spearhead. Some trapped divisions of the French 1ere Armee could not be saved and the retreat became a race to get behind the Somme River line before the Germans could close the door.

The RAF squadrons based in Flanders were also caught up in the great retreat. Some aircraft became lost while flying to their new bases in driving rain and made forced landings all over the countryside but on the whole the weather aided the retreat by keeping the Luftwaffe on the ground. The claims posted by the RAF for the first eight days of the Battle of Flanders were very impressive. The Hurricanes claimed a total of 249 German aircraft confirmed destroyed and 62 probables against 73 Hurricanes lost with 19 pilots killed, 6 captured, and 12 wounded. True Luftwaffe losses, based on their own reports, indicate that about 149 planes actually fell to the Hurricanes during this period. The British government’s policy was to publish the RAF figures without question and to treat the pilots as heroes which provided a much needed morale boost on the home front.

In early December the flying weather continued to be bad. Ground support from the Luftwaffe became sporatic at best. Temperatures plummeted during the nights and snow began to fall. The Allied retreat continued with the Germans pursuing and forcing the pace only when Allied units attempted to make a stand. The Germans discovered that their Panzers had great difficulties driving on ice slicked roads. Later in the coldest days of January even the weld seams became brittle and could crack when struck by even a minor blow, such as bumping into a tree. Under these conditions, the retreat to the Somme became a pure infantry struggle and a battle against both the elements and the enemy in equal measure.

The skies cleared a bit on December 20 and the air fighting resumed for a few days. The RAF had now adjusted some of its tactics and the fighters patrolled mostly at squadron strength, sometimes two squadrons patrolling together if they could manage to rendezvous in the air. This brought them much closer to parity with the Bf 109 groups and led to a tactical superiority over the Bf 110s that forced them onto the defensive. Combats continued in the succeeding weeks on the rare days when the weather permitted. January also brought the first encounters with the newly arrived Bf 109E-3 which carried an engine mounted 20mm cannon making it a lethal adversary in the air.

In the Netherlands there were new developments. Churchill had replaced Chamberlain as Prime Minister on December 18 as a result of the disaster in France. Now, true to their long tradition, the British were unable to resist the temptation to send an expedition to aid the Dutch. Just as predictably, the force chosen was large enough to be provocative but too small to be effective. The 24^th Guards, 146^th, and 148^th Infantry Brigades began disembarking in Amsterdam on Christmas Day. Hitler immediately gave orders for an operation to occupy the remainder of the Netherlands. The Dutch had opened many of their dykes at the beginning of the war and based their defense plan on the numerous rivers and flooded areas in the country. With the rivers and inundations now frozen over that plan was in serious trouble.

On January 17, 1940, eight divisions of the 18^th Army crossed into Holland. The first troops slipped across the frozen water barriers unobserved in a blinding snowstorm and established bridgeheads. Pioneer troops followed with bridging materials for bringing over the vehicles. The advance pressed forward methodically on foot with support from the Luftwaffe as the weather permitted. On January 26 the British began to reembark their troops. The RN destroyers Bulldog and Brazen were sunk on January 28, with 800 men aboard by Ju 87 dive bombers from StG 77 during a moment of clear weather. The rest of the force escaped back to England.

The bitter cold weather finally brought ground operations in France to a halt in January with the two adversaries facing each other across the Somme River. In the wake of the Allied retreat the Germans quickly advanced many of their fighter bases to the Pas de Calais region, fronting on the narrowest portion of the English Channel. The bombers moved into other bases slightly farther back in Flanders. With the ground war in intermission the Luftwaffe was free to turn its attentions on England. Attacks against shipping in the Channel began on February 9 and escalated over the next week. The squadrons of 11 Group, RAF Fighter Command were now being directly confronted over England. They rose to the challenge and a number of sharp actions were fought with losses on both sides. Mindful of the lessons from France, interceptions were generally made at squadron strength or better. The attacks moved inland as the month progressed striking at ports, airfields, and radar stations. Fortunately the weather did not permit any of these attacks to be sustained for more than a few days at a time and the British were able to repair the damage as fast as it was inflicted. Nonetheless, as March gave way to April, Fighter Command found itself stretched to the limit to meet the German threat.

General Weygand was appointed to replace General Gamelin as the French commander on December 15. In the next four months he worked with the greatest energy to bring order to the French position. The armored units that had been battered during the Battle of Flanders were reconstituted by absorbing many of the independent tank battalions. Weygand planned for a defense in depth behind the Somme River which was christened as the Weygand Line. Multiple lines of defense were begun behind the river but a shortage of materials and ground frozen rock hard slowed the work.

One problem that could not be remedied was the disparity of strength in the air. As the Luftwaffe shifted their operations across the English Channel the first priority of RAF Fighter Command became the defense of England. Air Chief Marshal Dowding told the government that it would be impossible to send any further fighter squadrons to France for the foreseeable future. The French air force, both in the quantity and quality of equipment, was completely over matched by the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe meanwhile, operating from an interior position, enjoyed the luxury of being able to send its forces over England on one day and over France on the next.

The German plan of attack called for Army Group B to breach the French position on the lower Somme and then drive spearheads towards Rouen and Le Havre. Army Group A would cross the river in the region of Reims and then drive in a southeasterly direction. At the appropriate time Army Group C would make a supporting attack against the Maginot Line. The Germans had also used the quiet period to bring their own armored units back up to strength and to field additional new infantry divisions.

The offensive began on April 19. The river crossings and the battles in the bridgeheads became a protracted struggle. It was only the heavy application of air power that finally tipped the balance and allowed the Germans to break through into open country. Even then the French continued to fight back with as much energy and more skill than in 1939. The British introduced their newly formed 1^st Armored Division into the battle in May and employed it with some initial success against the Germans breaking out from Abbeville. The French armored units, particularly the newly constituted 4eme D.C.R. under Colonel de Gaulle, also inflicted painful losses on the Germans. The RAF Hurricane squadrons in France acquitted themselves well but they were now being starved for replacements and their strength gradually melted away.

Despite the cost the German advance could ultimately not be stopped. The fighting moved across France, week by week, with the embattled defenders being forced back from each new river line and defended town. In July the survivors of the BEF were evacuated from Marseilles to North Africa. Those French soldiers with the spirit to continue the fight went with them. Mussolini is thought to have considered a grab for the French colonies in North Africa but in the end Italy continued to watch from the sidelines. The remaining forces in metropolitan France laid down their arms on July 28. The surrender ceremony took place in the same railroad car in which the Germans had accepted the armistice terms of 1918.

The Luftwaffe had flown only occasional attacks over England during the mid summer months while most of its energies were directed towards France. The Battle of Britain now built to a crescendo during August and September of 1940. Fighter Command had made good use of the intervening time and was equal to the challenge. Much of their success in the fall of 1940 was owed to the hard won lessons of the Winter Lions, the Hurricane squadrons, so named by Churchill, that had faced the first shock of combat with the Luftwaffe in the bitter months of 1939.

At a conference on August 9, Hitler instructed his generals to begin the planning for an attack in the East.

Authors Notes: My goal with this project was to explore the most likely outcome of a 1939 German offensive in the West. The possible course of events is based on the scattered clues in various sources and a lot of guesswork. For example, the outline of the German attack plan has appeared in print but the details had to be inferred from the way that the Germans used their resources in Poland. Historically the Germans dispersed their armored forces much more in Poland in 1939 than they would in France in 1940. The total tank strength on November 22 is a best estimate based on known production rates and an extrapolation backwards from the total of 2646 tanks on the strength of the 10 Panzer divisions reported on January 1, 1940 in our time line (Jentz, p.106). (Note that all grand totals cited for German armored strengths include numerous command tanks that were “armed” only with radios.) It is by no means certain that the Germans could have achieved any sort of armored breakthrough of the main Allied line in 1939 before running out of good weather. Regardless, the main burden would have fallen on the German infantry and artillery to clear the territory north of the Somme that Hitler had targeted for the first phase of the offensive.

The German attack across the Somme River follows the basic plan of the June 5, 1940 attack in our time line. The difference here is that General Weygand has had four months, rather than a mere eleven days, to prepare the line and imbue the French army with a new doctrine for defending against the blitzkrieg. Coupled with lighter losses in the previous fighting this should have made the campaign below the Somme a much more protracted affair. The most likely result of a 1939 German offensive is thus to inoculate the French with a non-lethal dose of blitzkrieg tactics which would then serve to increase their resistance in 1940.

The reader may wonder at the relative ineffectiveness of the Luftwaffe attacks against air bases as described here. In fact, the historical results in September, 1939 and May, 1940 were considerably less than many accounts would suggest. Only in June, 1941 did the Luftwaffe achieve a stunning success in this type of attack. The results described here for November 22, 1939 are in fact the exact same losses that were suffered on May 10, 1940 in the actual event. The other figures for RAF claims, losses, and actual German losses are based on historical performances in 1940 from the listed sources, scaled for the differences in conditions.

And finally, a note on the absence of airborne operations. The glider attack on Fort Eben-Emael was only actually put together in 1940. In 1939, the fortress would have been attacked by more conventional means, as the rest of the Belgian forts were in both time lines, with a few more casualties but the same result. This account is based on the tactics used against the Liege and Namur fortresses in our time line (Pallud, pp.370-392).

Selected Sources: One of the most detailed accounts of the military events of the Battle of France is found in “Blitzkrieg in the West - Then and Now”, Jean Paul Pallud, 1991. The organization of the German Panzer divisions in 1939 and their tactics are from “Panzer Truppen”, Thomas L. Jentz, 1996. The history of the air actions during the Phony War period in “Fledgling Eagles”, Christopher Shores, 1991 also contains air order of battle information for 1939 and information about the daily flying weather during the winter of 1939/40. “Blitzed”, Victor Bingham, 1990 tells the story of the RAF during the Battle of France and “Twelve Days in May”, Brian Cull and Bruce Lander, 1995 details the generally overlooked accomplishments of the RAF fighter squadrons. They make it possible to assess the potential of the RAF in this altered time line.